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ABSTRACT
Comedian Nathan Fielder opened a coffee shop which looked like a Starbucks, but he put the word
“dumb” in front of the Starbucks name. Fielder justified his behavior based on the argument that he
had created a parody of Starbucks. This article explores when a parody of a trademark may be entitled
to protection under the First Amendment. If so, what are the limits of this protection, especially when
a trademark holder argues that the parody is diluting his or her trademark by either blurring or
tarnishment? The article analyzes federal statutes and judicial decisions. It concludes with
recommendations to improve U.S. trademark law.
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PARODY IN TRADEMARK LAW: DUMB STARBUCKS MAKES TRADEMARK LAW
LOOK DUMB
DEBORAH J. KEMP, LYNN M. FORSYTHE & IDA M. JONES1*
I. INTRODUCTION
The story of DUMB STARBUCKS illustrates the law’s inconsistency in addressing
the intersection of parody, trademark infringement, dilution, and the First
Amendment. In February, 2014, in Los Angeles County, comedian Nathan Fielder
opened a coffee shop which looked just like a Starbucks, but in front of STARBUCKS
and the names of all the products was the word “dumb.” Fielder announced and posted
an online statement that DUMB STARBUCKS was a parody of STARBUCKS. 2 He
also objected to the Los Angeles County Health Department forcing the shop to close
for lack of a food serving permit, asserting that the coffee and food were art and so
there was no need for a food permit.3 While humorous, the story raises legitimate
questions about First Amendment free speech and parody protection against claims of
trademark infringement and dilution 4 by either blurring or tarnishment when the
parody is pretty “dumb.”
The Lanham Act has provided federal protection for trademarks since 1946 when
it prohibited trademark infringement, or palming off of a junior mark as that of the
senior mark holder.5 The law has expanded to include protection against a variety of
unfair competition activities, including dilution. The law of particular interest in the
DUMB STARBUCKS parody case is the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006

1* © Deborah J. Kemp, Lynn M. Forsythe, and Ida M. Jones 2014. Deborah J. Kemp is a professor
of Business Law in the Craig School of Business at the California State University, Fresno. She
earned her J.D. from the University of Florida. Lynn M. Forsythe is the Verna Mae and Wayne D.
Brooks Professor of Business Law in the Craig School of Business at the California State University,
Fresno. She earned her J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. Ida M. Jones is a Professor of Business
Law in the Craig School of Business at the California State University, Fresno. She is also the
university’s Director of the Center for Scholarly Advancement of Learning and Teaching. She earned
her J.D. from New York University.
2 Anthony Kurzweil, Dumb Starbucks’ Shut Down as Comedian Behind it Announces NYC Plans,
KTLA (Feb. 10, 2014, 5:32 PM), http://ktla.com/2014/02/10/starbucks–responds–to–dumb–starbucks–
parody–shop–2/.
3 Tenny Tatusian, Comedy Central’s Nathan Fielder is Behind Dumb Starbucks, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2014, 4:34 PM), http://www.latimes.com/food/dailydish/la–dd–nathan–fielder–dumb–
starbucks–story.html.
4 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). The authors use “dilution” and “anti–
dilution” interchangeably. Dilution gives one who has a famous mark a cause of action against a
junior user whose use of the mark, even in the absence of likely causing consumers to be confused,
blurs or tarnishes the senior mark. The concept was adopted in statutory form by about half the
states, and since 1995 has been recognized in federal trademark statutory law.
5 I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 112, 114 n.3 (D. Mass. 1998). The authors
use “senior mark” to denote the registered mark or the first use of the mark. “Junior mark” denotes
the second and potentially infringing use. Id.
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(TDRA).6 It gives owners of famous trademarks a right to sue junior mark holders for
blurring the distinctiveness of the senior mark or for tarnishing the reputation of the
senior mark holder, similar to common law product disparagement and trade libel. 7
The TDRA allows non-commercial uses of a mark and allows fair use such as parody
when the use is not as the junior mark holder’s designation of source.8 Neither
exception would apply to Nathan Fielder who was using his mark both as a source
designation and commercially. 9 The TDRA, by providing famous and wealthy senior
mark holders with a cause of action to prevent junior mark holders from diluting the
senior mark, likely increases the costs small junior mark holders might incur in
conducting their businesses, by requiring them to defend against possibly less than
meritorious claims by the famous senior mark holder, a sort of trademark bullying.10
Part II tells the story of DUMB STARBUCKS. Part III contains a summary of
trademark law. Part IV contains summaries of trademark parody cases. Part V
contains an analysis of trademark parody law. 11

6 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), Pub. L. No. 109–312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730
(2006) (codified at Lanham Act 43 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)). The TDRA replaced the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (repealed).
7 See Ethan Horwitz and Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A Retrospective of Section
43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA AND ENT L. J. 59, 59–60 (1996); Jennifer Files Beerline,
Anti-Dilution Law, New and Improved: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 511, 511 (2008) (“Federal [trademark] law provides famous trademark owners with power
over and above traditional trademark protection.”).
8 15 U.S.C. § 1025(c)(3) (2012). The TDRA labels the defenses “exclusions.”
9 Admittedly, the definition of “commercial use” varies within the law. Nathan Fielder was
reportedly giving the coffee away for free, so one might argue that it was a non–commercial use. The
authors assume a business such as a store that provides coffee and pastries to customers, even without
charging for the goods, is engaging in commerce. According to reports, the beverages were being given
away free. See Rachel Zarrell, People Are Waiting for Hours to Visit a “Dumb Starbucks” Coffee Shop
in California, BUZZFEED (Feb. 9, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/rachelzarrell/a–dumb–
starbucks–coffee–shop–is–the–newest–craze–in–californ. The L.A. County Health Department
treated Dumb Starbucks as a commercial enterprise and ordered it to close, even though Nathan
Fielder during his press conference called it an art installation. Id.
10 See generally, Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 641–
652 (2011).
11 See e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48, 56 (1988). While this article concentrates
on trademark parody, the Hustler Magazine case illustrates the First Amendment privilege in
defamation cases from a point of view that it is not receiving sufficient protection under the current
interpretation of trademark law, that of parodic sexual speech. Id. at 46–47. Hustler Magazine
published a parody “of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the name and picture of
[Falwell] entitled ‘Jerry Falwell talks about his first time.’” Id. at 48. It was “modeled after Campari
ads that included interviews with various celebrities about their ‘first times.’” Id. “Although it was
apparent by the end of each interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari, the ads
clearly played on the double entendre of the sexual subject of ‘first times.’” Id. Hustler drafted a
fictitious interview with Falwell in which he stated that his “first time” was during a drunken
incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse, suggesting that he was a hypocrite. Id. The
ad contained the disclaimer in small print, “ad parody – not to be taken seriously.” Id. The Court
concluded that public figures and public officials must show ‘actual malice,’ i.e., “knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.” Id. at 56. Famous
people in the United States have no cause of action for parodic speech unless it is done maliciously.
Yet First Amendment limitations might not be available to defend against famous companies who sue
for dilution or trademark infringement.
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The authors find:
1. Trademark law overprotects famous businesses.
2. Junior mark holders might have undue expenses in defending.
3. Terms and concepts should be clearly defined to avoid a chilling effect of
unclear law.
4. Commercial and brand parody12 should have broader First Amendment
protection than that expressed in the TDRA.
5. The internet is a good tool to educate the public and to help protect
freedom of expression.
6. Inconsistency among circuits makes the law unpredictable.
7. Congress should eliminate dilution as a cause of action in federal law.
8. Some changes based on the findings are also suggested.
II. STORY
In February, 2014, the media and social media websites were teeming with news
of the opening of an establishment in Los Angeles called DUMB STARBUCKS that
was giving away free coffee. Comedian Nathan Fielder opened the store to obtain
publicity for his Comedy Central show, Nathan for You.13 He used Starbucks’ famous
trademark and coffee terminology and inserted DUMB in front of them. 14 Fielder also
distributed a Frequently Asked Questions document where he explained his view that
he can legally use STARBUCKS in his coffee shop’s name because he is making a
parody of Starbucks.15 Starbucks has a trademark in its name and mermaid logo.
Three days after DUMB STARBUCKS was opened, the Los Angeles County Health
Department closed it down for lack of a health permit. 16 Appendix I contains online
sites summarizing the story, the FAQ document, and photos from the shop.
DUMB STARBUCKS appears to be trademark infringement because it uses
Starbucks’ mark.
However, finding trademark infringement requires finding
likelihood of confusion and consumers were not confused about the source of the coffee
they obtained. So there would not be trademark infringement. But DUMB
STARBUCKS could dilute the value of the Starbucks mark. Dilution can occur by
blurring and/or tarnishment. Generally, parody is a defense to both trademark
infringement and dilution. Fielder claimed he was making a parody. Consumers stood
12 See Stacey L. Dogan and Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473, 485
(2013).
“Parody as brand differs from parody as product because the parody is being used as an indicator
of source.” Id. “Building a brand name around someone else’s trademark looks, to some observers,
like a classic case of ‘free riding,’ with the parodist taking advantage of the allure of the targeted
brand.” Id. “Trademark holders, not surprisingly, abhor the practice and sue to prevent it.” Id.
13 TV Comedian Nathan Fielder Behind Dumb Starbucks, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2014, 9:57 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/tv–comedian–nathan–fielder–behind–dumb–starbucks/.
14 Id.
15 Id. See Rachel Zarrell, People Are Waiting for Hours to Visit a “Dumb Starbucks” Coffee Shop
in California, BUZZFEED (Feb. 9, 2014, 4:30 PM) http://www.buzzfeed.com/rachelzarrell/a–dumb–
starbucks–coffee–shop–is–the–newest–craze–in–californ.
16 Samantha Schaefer, Joke’s on L.A.: Comedy Central behind Dumb Starbucks Faux Shop, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la–me–ln–dumb–starbucks–
comedy–central–20140210,0,7187119.story.
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in line for hours, not to get a cup of Starbucks coffee, but to get what they clearly knew
was a disposable cup with DUMB above the name STARBUCKS, probably for the
novelty of the experience and for the possibility that the cup would become a collector’s
item.
The authors ask whether putting DUMB above a famous trademark is a parody.
It might not be, since many courts require that the alleged parody “poke fun” at the
senior mark holder or its product. Fielder denied poking fun at Starbucks or its coffee.
If Felder’s business is not a parody, could Starbucks prevail in a trademark dilution
action? If Starbucks could prove dilution, could Fielder still claim a First Amendment
right to entertain us by creating an art store that gives away coffee? Fielder was
poking fun at the trademark law system more than he was poking fun at Starbucks.
This article discusses the above questions, explaining the statute and case law, and
examining the wisdom of current U.S. trademark law, especially as it applies to
parodies.
III. TRADEMARK, DILUTION, AND PARODY BASICS
A. The Value of Trademarks
Private property ownership, management, and rights enforcement are
foundations of the social contract between business and society. This contract permits
efficient societal distribution of property through rewarding property users, thereby
preventing waste and underutilization of resources.17 Intellectual property (IP) rights
are included in the right of private property ownership and are key to promoting and
encouraging innovation, invention, and brand identities through a legal system that
allows creation of IP and protection of the rights holders. These systems of protection
can encourage new business development, reduce inefficiencies, and induce technology
acquisition and creation.
IP legal systems have two central economic objectives. The first is to encourage
businesses to innovate and invest in knowledge creation. Businesses have an incentive
to do so because the law creates a kind of monopoly for the business that creates
technologies, information, goods and services. That monopoly, which gives creators
exclusive rights to their creations, prevents competitors from taking and using those
developments without compensation. 18 The second objective is to encourage innovators
to bring those innovations to the marketplace. Information is a public good that
improves society when shared/exchanged. The more knowledge creators place in the
social marketplace, the better informed is society. 19
There is a tradeoff between these two objectives. The law seeks to provide
reasonable return on investment for the knowledge creators. In addition, the law seeks
17 Daniel R. Cahoy, Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game: How the Prospective
Application of Judicial Decision Related to Intellectual Property Can Promote Economic Efficiency, 41
AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 7 (2003).
18 See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 471, 473 (2000).
19 Id. at 473–474.
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to temper private property rights so that knowledge creation and exchange are
encouraged.20 The legal system needs to find a balance that is “appropriate to market
conditions and conducive to growth.”21 Enforcement is another important element of
an IP system. “[E]nforcement entails two opposing tasks: punishing infringement by
free riders and disciplining enterprises that try to extend their rights beyond intended
levels by acting in an anti-competitive manner.”22
Because intellectual property is different from land and tangible property, it is
more complicated to analyze and enforce.23 For example, IP is not scarce, at least not
in the way real and personal property are scarce resources. IP is intangible property.
Yet the law assumes that IP protection is as valuable as protecting tangible property
rights; if it isn’t protected, it might be under-produced or wasted, which results in
market inefficiencies. Failure to protect IP may reduce availability of related
resources.24 Over-protection, on the other hand, may harm progress by raising the
costs of creation and by permitting monopolistic behavior by IP owners, which creates
inefficiencies. “The potential gains and losses depend on the competitive structure of
markets and the efficiency of IP business regulation, including aspects of competition
policy and technology development policy.”25
Trademarks are a different type of IP in that the law protects the trademark in
order to protect the association, that is, customer goodwill, between the product and
the mark. The right to create and use a trademark allows businesses to build a strong
association between the brand and the product.26 To promote this association, marks
must be sufficiently unique to avoid confusion by consumers and to reduce their search
costs.27 Trademark protection systems encourage firms to invest in name recognition
and product quality. These systems also induce licensees to protect asset value by
selling goods of guaranteed quality.
If trademarks were not protected, rival firms could pass off their lower-quality
goods as legitimate versions of those produced by recognized companies. That would
discourage companies from engaging in innovation because there would be insufficient
return on investment and it would permit free riders to gain the benefit of any research
and development without incurring the costs. This situation would diminish incentives
for maintaining quality and would raise consumer search costs.
Enforcement of IP rights is a critical component of promoting and protecting
return on investment. In the United States, Congress, state legislatures, and the
Cahoy, supra note 17, at 13.
Maskus, supra note 18, at 474.
22 Id. at 476; Cahoy, supra note 17, at 14.
23 Cahoy, supra note 17, at 8.
24 Id. at 9.
25 Maskus, supra note 18, at 471–472. See also Robert E. Evenson, Intellectual Property Rights
and Economic Development, By Keith Maskus, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 187, 187 (2001)
(commenting on Maskus’s article); Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well–Known Marks in China:
Challenges for Foreign Mark Holders, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 371, 390–91 (2008) (discussing the problems
of protecting trademarks in China and whether China is complying with TRIPS); and Wei Shi,
Globalization and Indigenization: Legal Transplant of a Universal TRIPS Regime in a Multicultural
World, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 455 (2010) (comparing the Intellectual Property Rights Systems (IPRS) of
China, Japan, and South Korea and discussing the social and religious values under which a nation’s
IPRS system must operate).
26 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 502.
27 Cahoy, supra note 17, at 14.
20
21
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judicial system provide that protection. In an IP article Daniel Cahoy, business law
professor, noted that the judicial system and its interpretations of trademarks have a
significant impact on the economic value of a trademark. 28 Cahoy notes that the value
of a trademark is especially sensitive to a court’s retroactive interpretation of whether
a trademark is protected or not. That arises when senior mark holders file suits for
trademark infringement and trademark dilution. If the courts are inconsistent in their
application of the law and unexpectedly reduce or increase protection for a particular
mark, the court’s decisions have a far-reaching impact on businesses and valuation of
their trademarks.29
Trademarks serve an information role for consumers. Consumers’ preference for
a certain brand is expressive conduct that should be protected by the First
Amendment. A consumer who sees another consumer with certain trademarked
property receives information about that other consumer. The issue isn’t whether the
consumer made the choice, necessarily, but instead consumers letting other consumers
know the choices they’ve made.30
Parodies appeal to a segment of the public also. 31 Brand parodies appeal to those
who might ridicule or make a social commentary about the value of a trademark or
brand. Those who create parodied goods are also providing information to their coconspirators in the parody and to those who purchase the trademarked goods. 32
It is against this backdrop that the authors examine U.S. trademark law and
justifiable uses of senior marks.
B. Trademark Basics
“A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol or design, or a combination thereof, that
identifies and distinguishes the source of the goods of one party from those of others.” 33
Trademark law is often justified as a consumer protection law, designed to assure
consumers that they are buying a reputable product or service from a reputable
provider, but it is also beneficial to businesses, assisting them in establishing goodwill.
“Trademarks make it easier for consumers to quickly identify the source of a given
Id. at 23.
Id. This is an issue unique to IP both because IP protection is relatively recent and because
there is no physical boundary to use as a clear dividing line.
30 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 495.
31 Id. at 496.
32 Id.
33 See Frequently Asked Questions About Trademarks, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). The site contains little
in the way of definitions and legal information. It is designed to help those wishing to obtain a
trademark. See also, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012):
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to
register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is
unknown.
28
29
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good. … By making goods easier to identify, trademarks also give manufacturers an
incentive to invest in the quality of their goods. ... Trademark law furthers these goals
by regulating the proper use of trademarks.” 34 Businesses rely on trademark law to
give them a marketing advantage over competitors by establishing business goodwill. 35
Trademark law began as part of the common law of unfair competition. 36 Since a
trademark is a source identifier, infringement is similar to the common law tort of
palming off or passing off. States have both common and statutory trademark and
unfair competition laws.37 The federal government chose to regulate trademarks in
the Lanham Act38 in 1947, yet it has consistently provided that federal trademark does
not preempt state law.39 Congress obtained its authority to regulate unfair
competition and trademark from the constitution’s Commerce Clause 40 rather than
from the Progress Clause.41 The latter authorizes protecting patents and copyrights
as embodying the federal government’s interests in promoting social and economic

34
Overview of Trademark Law, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
35 1 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:20 (4th ed. 1997).
“Good will and its symbol, a trademark, are inseparable. A trademark has no independent
significance apart from the good will it symbolizes. If there is no business and no good will, a
trademark symbolizes nothing."
36 Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE L. J. 759, 764 (1990); see e.g., Estate
of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1372 (D.N.J. 1981) (citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,
240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) in stating “the common law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of
unfair competition”); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of
Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 312 (1979).
37 See generally, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (2009).
38 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq. (2012). The Legal Information Institute introduces the Lanham Act
with the following description:
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq., was enacted by Congress in 1946 based
on the power granted to it by the Commerce Clause. It provides for a national
system of trademark registration and protects the owner of a federally registered
mark against the use of similar marks if such use is likely to result in consumer
confusion, or if the dilution of a famous mark is likely to occur. The scope of the
Lanham Act is independent of and concurrent with state common law.
Lanham
Act,
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
39 Id. See, Lynda J. Oswald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring" Under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 269–270, n. 85 (1999). Oswald wrote that the legislative history of
the FTDA of 1995 states that the federal statute does not preempt state dilution statutes. Since
federal trademark law does not preempt state trademark and unfair competition law, it is different
from copyright law where federal law preempts similar state law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2013):
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright … are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
40 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have power … to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.”).
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progress through protection of writings and inventions. Trademarks are not a
traditional type of IP.42
The mark must be distinctive and courts have classified marks into levels of
distinctiveness with varying levels of protection for each category. 43 The nature of the
classification depends on the relationship of the word or mark to the product. 44 The
most protected are marks designated as arbitrary or fanciful. According to the Patent
and Trademark office, fanciful marks are those “invented for the sole purpose of
functioning as a trademark or service mark” and “arbitrary marks that are in common
linguistic use” but do not describe the goods or characteristics of the goods. 45 Ones that
are suggestive get second level protection. Descriptive marks get third level. Generic
marks get fourth level protection. STARBUCKS is considered a distinctive mark,
probably fanciful, so is entitled to maximum legal protection.
Assuming the mark is sufficiently distinct to be protected, the senior mark
owner has the burden of showing that the junior mark holder created a likelihood of
confusion by consumers.46 This means confusion as to identity or source of the goods
or services. In the DUMB STARBUCKS case consumers were not confused. The
consumers did not believe they were buying Starbucks coffee. They stood in line for
hours to get a cup that looked just like a Starbucks cup but had DUMB above the
STARBUCKS name.47 They did that because Nathan Fielder was making a joke and
they thought it was novel or that they might be on Fielder’s Comedy Central television
show. So Starbucks might lose if it claimed trademark infringement.
C. Dilution Basics
Even though Starbucks would not be able to show likelihood of confusion for
trademark infringement, it has a second option in federal trademark law. The senior
mark holder may claim dilution. Since 1995 businesses have obtained federal
statutory recognition of protection against dilution. 48 Following Frank Schechter’s
1927 law review article arguing that a trademark is actually a property right and

42 Yet, trademark has IP aspects and is treated as IP in business law courses. The new dilution
statute goes farther in treating trademark as IP in that it provides enforcement rights in the absence
of consumer confusion, treating the trademark as property protectable by the mark holder.
43 Overview of Trademark Law, supra note 34.
44
TMEP,
§
1209.01a
(9th
ed.
Oct.
2012),
available
at
http://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/detail/manual/TMEP/Oct2012/TMEP–1200d1e6993.xml (last visited
June 15, 2014).
45 Id.
46 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012). For instance subsection (1) provides in part: “Any person who shall…
use in commerce any…copy…of a registered mark in connection with the…distribution…of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion… shall be liable in a
civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.” The remedies are injunction and
money damages if the infringement is intentional. Id.
47 See Appendix I and the websites noted therein.
48 See Scot A. Duvall, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006: Balanced Protection for
Famous Brands, 97 THE TRADEMARK REPORTER 1252, 1253 (2007). This is the official publication of
the International Trademark Association (INTA). The author helped draft the TDRA.
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should be protected as such,49 states began enacting dilution statutes that allow the
senior mark holder to stop others from using the mark in a way that blurs or tarnishes
its identity. The state statutory causes of action provided trademark owners with a
protectable property right in their trademarks. 50
States enacted dilution statutes before the federal government did and about half
of the states have dilution statutes. 51 In 1995 the federal government enacted its
dilution statute, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). 52 Then in 2006 it
enacted the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), replacing the FTDA,
further clarifying dilution, and overruling a Supreme Court decision interpreting the
federal dilution statute to require actual dilution rather than likelihood of dilution. 53
Both the FTDA and the TDRA protect against dilution of a trademark by an infringer
even if there is no likelihood of consumer confusion when the trademark owner proves
blurring and/or tarnishment.54 While the TDRA is a better drafted law than was the

49

Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 814

(1927).
50 See Jordan M. Blanke, Victor’s Little Secret: Supreme Court Decision Means More Protection
for Trademark Parody, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1053, 1061 (2003)
(“Significantly, the purpose behind anti–dilution laws is not to avoid consumer confusion, but rather,
to promote a property–like interest in the mark itself.”) In the 1940’s states began enacting antidilution statutes. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 811 (1997):
Yet in 1947, just one year after enactment of the Lanham Act, Massachusetts
adopted the first state anti-dilution statute, which provided: "Likelihood of injury
to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or
trade–mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief . . . notwithstanding the absence
of competition between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or
services." Other states followed suit and by January 1996, when President Clinton
signed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act into law, twenty–eight states had
adopted identical or substantially similar anti-dilution statutes, and at least one
state had recognized dilution as part of its common law. (citations omitted).
See also Robert G. Bone, Symposium Review: Schechter's Ideas in Historical Context and
Dilution's Rocky Road, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 497 (2008); Patrick
Emerson, “I'm Litigatin' It”: Infringement, Dilution, and Parody Under the Lanham Act, 9 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 477, 478 (2011); Mathias Strasser, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection
Revisited: Putting the Dilution Doctrine into Context, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
375, 406 (2000).
51 Mark H. Anania, Note: The Plight of Small Business Trademark Holders, 59 RUTGERS L. REV.
565, 579, 588 (2007). States generally use one of the two model statutes included in the United States
Trademark Association Model State Trademark Bill. It is unknown how the two model statutes differ
from one another, which is beyond the scope of this article.
52 Pub. L. No. 104–98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(Supp. II 1996), replaced by Pub. L. 109–312, 109th Cong., 120 Stat. 1731 (Oct. 6, 2006), codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (“This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006’’.) For
an excellent summary of the FTDA and the status of trademark law as of 1998, see Oswald, supra
note 39.
53 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012). “… [T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive… shall be
entitled to an injunction against another person who…commences use of a mark or trade name in
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous
mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual
economic injury.” (emphasis added).
54 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) and (C) (2012):
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FTDA, there are still areas where reasonable courts may differ. As regards the TDRA,
it is disturbing that a business trade group, the International Trademark Association
(INTA), which has the most to gain from strong trademark protection was the main
proponent and drafter of the federal dilution legislation. It is like the fox guarding the
henhouse.
The TDRA added definitions of blurring and tarnishment and clarified that the
burden of proof for the senior mark holder was to show likelihood of dilution, rather
than the actual dilution the Supreme Court had decided was the requirement under
the FTDA.55 Since one of the issues in this inquiry into DUMB STARBUCKS’ legality
concerns whether the TDRA changed dilution law significantly, the rest of this section
compares the former FTDA with its replacement law the TDRA and explains the
TDRA.
Both statutes apply only to the owner of a famous mark. But the TDRA clarifies
the meaning of “famous mark” by adding that it is one “that is distinctive, inherently
or through acquired distinctiveness.” 56 Both statutes state that an injunction is the
appropriate remedy. The FTDA used the terminology “dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark.” The TDRA says “dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment.”
The TDRA added definitions for the two types of dilution. There is substantial overlap
between the two. The TDRA’s definition of blurring is more detailed than its definition
of tarnishment. Either type of dilution could be subjected to a fair use defense,
including parody.57 This may have an impact on federal dilution law in that the courts
now have factors to consider when deciding whether blurring has occurred. But the
impact on the results in dilution cases may not be significant.

(B) For purposes of paragraph (1), “dilution by blurring” is association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs
the distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(C) For purposes of paragraph (1), “dilution by tarnishment” is association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
harms the reputation of the famous mark.
Blurring is more specifically described by the statute’s list of factors the court
should consider when deciding whether blurring has occurred. Since tarnishment
has only the bare definition without further factors a court should consider, it is
more difficult to predict.
See e.g., Laura E. Little, Regulating Funny: Humor and the Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1235, 1272
(2009):
[T]he general purpose of the tarnishment theory is to redress injuries caused by
degrading a mark's positive associations and using it for “unwholesome or
degrading goods or services.” … [C]ourts have found dilution by tarnishment where
a defendant used a plaintiff's trademark in the context of humor based on bodily
functions and drug culture as well as adult cartoons, websites, live entertainment,
and movies. As in the infringement setting, tarnishment cases are unpredictable,
with parodies on relatively uncontroversial subjects sometimes becoming entangled
in the liability net and unsavory subject matter occasionally avoiding capture
(citations omitted).
55 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).
56 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
57 Id. Parody is also provided for in the TDRA, which was not the case in the FTDA. The Lanham
Act does not define parody, however.
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The TDRA adds language to clarify that likelihood of confusion is not a
requirement.58 It adds that dilution may occur “regardless of the presence or absence
of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.” This
language was inserted to clarify that Congress was overturning the Supreme Court’s
holding in Moseley I59 that one claiming dilution would have to show actual dilution
rather than a mere likelihood of dilution.60 Consequently, the claimant’s burden is
only to show likelihood of dilution under the TDRA. 61 This has resulted in lack of
uniformity of federal law on dilution among the circuits.
The TDRA added a section called “Definitions.” It contains three items significant
to this discussion: a restatement of the criteria for being a famous mark, 62 a definition

58 Id. The TDRA states “regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury.”
59 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432–433:
The relevant text of the FTDA…provides that "the owner of a famous mark" is
entitled to injunctive relief against another person's commercial use of a mark or
trade name if that use "causes dilution of the distinctive quality" of the famous
mark. ... This text unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather
than a likelihood of dilution.
60 Id. at 434:
It may well be…that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not
be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proven through circumstantial
evidence…. Whatever difficulties of proof may be entailed, they are not an
acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory
violation. The evidence in the present record is not sufficient to support the
summary judgment on the dilution count.
See Julie Manning Magid, Anthony D. Cox, and Dena S. Cox, Quantifying Brand Image:
Empirical Evidence of Trademark Dilution, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 26–27 (2006) (proposing an
experimental design that could be used to measure trademark dilution under the TDRA and Moseley
I).
61 The Supreme Court in Moseley said the showing of actual dilution did not require proof of harm,
actual loss, etc. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003):
Of course, that does not mean that the consequences of dilution, such as an actual
loss of sales or profits, must also be proved. To the extent that language in the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in the Ringling Bros. case suggests otherwise ... we
disagree. We do agree, however, with that court's conclusion that, at least where
the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally
associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish
actionable dilution.
That qualifying statement indicated that the difference between proving dilution and
proving likelihood of dilution was more semantic than substantive. The above statement
regarding consumer association between the senior and junior mark should still be good law.
62 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012):
For purposes of paragraph (1), a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the
goods or services of the mark’s owner. In determining whether a mark possesses
the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors,
including the following:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of
the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services
offered under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
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of blurring, and a definition of tarnishment. This probably does not have a significant
impact on federal dilution law.
The first item in “Definitions” is the listing of the factors to consider in deciding
whether a mark is famous. The TDRA has 4 factors while the FTDA had 8. However,
the TDRA combines several factors from the FTDA into one factor, so they are still
similar.63 Whether a mark is sufficiently famous to qualify for protection under the
TDRA is beyond the scope of this article, since Starbucks is a strong mark.
The TDRA defined blurring and tarnishment. Blurring is “association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs
the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 64 The statute provides guidance by
suggesting factors for courts to consider when determining whether the defendant’s
actions amounted to actionable dilution by blurring. They are:
1. The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.
2. The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.
3. The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in
substantially exclusive use of the mark.
4. The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
5. Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an
association with the famous mark.
6. Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.65
The factors do not clarify what is blurring, but are a non-exclusive list of
considerations to help illuminate the concept. The description of blurring is
reminiscent of defamation or disparagement. Blurring might be more aptly named
slurring since many of the cases that find dilution involve disparaging uses of the
senior mark, what many readers might call tarnishment.

(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
63 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012):
For purposes of paragraph (1), “dilution by blurring” is association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark. In determining whether a mark or trade name
is likely to cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors,
including the following:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in
substantially exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an
association with the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.
64 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012).
65 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i-vi) (2012).
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The LEXIS v. LEXUS66 case illustrates blurring, although it was decided before
enactment of the TDRA with its definition of blurring. Mead Data Central sued Toyota
Motor Sales for dilution of its trademark LEXIS, the legal data base, when Toyota
started its luxury brand of LEXUS cars. The district court, applying New York’s
dilution law, ordered Toyota to stop marketing cars under the trade name LEXUS. 67
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on an expedited appeal so that Toyota
would not have to stop selling Lexus automobiles while awaiting results of an appeal.68
Two findings supported the circuit court’s reversal. First, in order to qualify for the
highest protection, the mark must be fanciful or arbitrary. The term LEXIS is actually
a Latin word used and found in English language dictionaries and not fanciful as is
required to be a highly protected mark. So LEXIS was not given the highest
protection.69 The second finding related to the mark’s recognition, i.e. whether it was
famous enough, and Mead lost that argument. Most people have not heard of LEXIS
the legal database.70 Blurring through use of similar marks makes the case intriguing.
It is not “slurring,” because it is not disparaging, but an innocent blurring of the two
marks by the second user. McCarthy in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK identified the
“neurological and economic theory,” where some scholars argue there is economic harm
to consumers when the consumer must spend a fraction of a second longer to link the
mark to its source once blurring has occurred.71 Did the reader think about legal
research for a fraction of a second when deciding whether to purchase a LEXUS?
Dilution by tarnishment is different than an innocent similarity like LEXIS and
LEXUS. However, a number of courts use blurring even when the junior mark holder’s
use of the senior mark is unsavory, so the distinction between tarnishment and
blurring is blurred. Tarnishment is “association arising from the similarity between a
mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous
mark.”72 Had Starbucks sued Fielder for DUMB STARBUCKS, Starbucks would
probably have claimed dilution by tarnishment. This is the type of dilution that is
limited by the fair use parody defense when junior users are poking fun at or criticizing
the famous senior mark owner. This is similar to a cause of action for trade libel or
product disparagement where the plaintiff has the burden of showing injury to the

66 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., U.S.A., 875 F.2d 1026, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989)
(reversing district court’s finding of dilution and finding no blurring).
67 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031, 1045 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
68 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 308, 308 (2d Cir. 1989)
(granting a reversal of district court’s permanent injunction, opinion subsequently published as Mead
Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989)). See Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1027 (2d Cir. 1989).
69 Mead Data Cent., Inc., 875 F.2d at 1027.
70 Id. at 1028. Most readers of this article, as legal professionals, however, will recognize the
similarity between LEXIS and LEXUS.
71 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, at § 24:72: “… the argument that proponents of anti–dilution law
have forwarded: Blurring diffuses the meaning of a mark, increases mental search costs and delays
consumer thinking of mark to source….” McCarthy cites, quotes from, and discusses Rebecca
Tushnet’s article on the topic. See generally, Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law and Cognitive Science,
86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 508 (2008).
72 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2012).
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product or a company’s reputation.73 However, under the TDRA the plaintiff only has
to show likelihood of dilution rather than actual harm to its reputation.
The former FTDA had listed defenses to dilution. The TDRA amended the FTDA
in regards to defenses (exclusions). This might have a significant impact on federal
dilution law. The TDRA added nominative and descriptive fair use;74 parody, criticism,
and comment; and limitation of fair use to uses of the senior mark that are not a source
designation of the junior mark holder’s mark. The TDRA now says:
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment under this subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation
of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of
source for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with—
advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services; or
identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark
owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.75 (emphasis added by authors)
The language in bold letters, by statutorily limiting when parody and fair use are
available as defenses, might have reduced courts’ use of the defenses in trademark
infringement and dilution cases when the junior mark holder is using the senior mark
commercially and/or as its own source indicator. The TDRA provides that noncommercial parody for other than identification of a junior mark is protected. By
negative implication, it is possible some courts will assume the law will not now protect
brand parody of a senior mark by a junior mark holder, that is using the parody as
part of his or her own mark. This would limit the fair use and parody doctrine’s
application in dilution law substantially. So courts who wish to use the parody defense
to protect the junior mark holder must resort to general parody case law developed for
both traditional trademark infringement with its likelihood of confusion and for
dilution generally. Nathan Fielder with his DUMB STARBUCKS would not be able to
take advantage of the TDRA’s parody defense because he was designating the source
of his product and service as DUMB STARBUCKS.
As long as the TDRA’s defenses list is not interpreted as limiting fair use defenses,
the prior parody law should continue to protect junior mark holders who use the senior
mark even as a designation of source, so long as the use is parodic, called “brand

73 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561 (1981).
See Steven B. Morgan, The First
Amendment and the Corporate Plaintiff: Applicability of the New York Times Standard to Corporate
Defamation and Product Disparagement, 19 VAL. U. L. REV. 847, 847–48 (1985), available at
http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1515&context=vulr (summarizing both W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (undated) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561 (1981)).
74 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2012). Nominative fair use occurs when the senior mark is used to
compare with the junior mark. Descriptive fair use occurs when the senior mark’s words are used to
describe the product, like a cereal that is all bran. See Overview of Trademark Law, supra note 34.
That nominative and descriptive uses of a senior mark are permitted is recognized law. It is legal for
Crest toothpaste owner to talk about Gleem toothpaste when comparing the products in an
advertisement. Neither nominative nor descriptive fair uses are relevant for the Fielder parody
defense claim. Id.
75 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012).
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parody.”76 As it turns out, well-known businesses with famous trademarks had better
have a pretty thick skin, since at least two circuits have held that the First Amendment
allows junior mark holders to make fun of famous senior mark holders. 77
D. Fair Use and Parody Basics
Parody is an ancient literary technique.78 It calls to mind another’s work and
alters it in a humorous or satiric way. The editors of THE OXFORD BOOK OF PARODIES
traced parody back to before the 14th century, before THE CANTERBURY TALES was
published.79 The Oxford Dictionary definition of parody is “an imitation of the style of
a particular writer, artist, or genre with deliberate exaggeration for comic effect.” 80
Trademark parody is a bit different in that it imitates the mark rather than the style
or genre; it does tend to be humorous, however.
Parody can be considered a defense under both traditional trademark
infringement and dilution causes of action. However, it is probably not a very good
parody and probably will not be protected if consumers are likely confused in believing
that the senior mark holder is responsible for the parodic use. 81 Fair use in trademark
law is similar to the doctrine as used in copyright law 82 in that it protects the public
interest in preserving the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. Two judicial
developments through copyright fair use have benefited courts applying fair use in
trademark situations. One is the realization that commercial uses of a work or senior
mark can be fair use, in that commerciality is merely a factor to consider when deciding
whether the second use is fair and hence not infringing. The second is the judicial
recognition that parody is a form of fair use. 83 The Supreme Court in its Campbell

76 See generally, Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, coining the term “brand parody” to describe
humorous or biting uses of the senior mark holder for one’s own trademark. DUMB STARBUCKS, if
it is a parody at all, is a brand parody.
77 See e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 211, 212 (2d Cir. 2013)
(Starbucks VI), and Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 261, 262
(4th Cir. 2007).
78 ARISTOTLE, POETICS ii.5 (Richard Janko trans., 1987); RYAN BISHOP, COMEDY AND CULTURAL
CRITIQUE IN AMERICAN FILM 93 (2013).
79 THE OXFORD BOOK OF PARODIES, John Gross, ed., 2010. "The political cartoon is a weapon of
attack, of scorn and ridicule and satire; it is least effective when it tries to pat some politician on the
back. It is usually as welcome as a bee sting and is always controversial in some quarters.” Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988) (citing and quoting Long, The Political Cartoon:
Journalism's Strongest Weapon, THE QUILL, 56, 57 (Nov. 1962)).
80
Parody,
OXFORD
DICTIONARY,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/parody (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
81 See MCCARTHY, supra note 35, at § 31:153. Starbucks prevailed in a case where the junior
mark holder’s LESSBUCKS COFFEE was denied registration on the basis of survey results showing
consumers thought that LESSBUCKS was associated with STARBUCKS. Starbucks Coffee Company
v. Marshall S. Ruben, 78 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1741 (T.T.A.V. 2006).
82 See generally, WILLIAM PATRY, THE FAIR USE DEFENSE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985). Fair use
came into copyright law from British common law, so is not based on the First Amendment. While
the concept of fair use derived from copyright, the doctrine is different in trademark law.
83 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579–80 (1994). The Supreme Court has only once
before even considered whether parody may be fair use, and that time issued no opinion because of
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musical copyright case affirmed that even though the copyright fair use statute84 did
not specifically mention parody as a form of fair use, it could still be fair use. 85 Parody
had been considered a form of fair use prior to the 1976 Copyright Act that took fair
use from the common law and incorporated it into that statute.86 So in addition to noncommercial uses recognized under the copyright fair use statute is the use of another’s
IP for parody, to make fun of the protected mark, name, or work of art if it is
copyright.87 Parody of a trademark could be an infringement if there is a likelihood of
consumer confusion between the senior mark and the parodic one. 88 Trademark
parody could possibly be dilution if the parody causes a likelihood of dilution of the
senior mark under the above explained language of the TDRA.
Congress has not defined parody either in the copyright or the trademark statutes.
The courts have defined parody and have disallowed imitative works that do not satisfy
the judicial concept of parody.89 But the judicial definition leaves it to the court to
effectively be a censor of expression if the court deems the parody to be either nonparodic or offensive. For instance, in Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps
Chewing Gum,90 the court found infringement when the defendant was making fun of
the senior mark holder’s Cabbage Patch Dolls.91 It said children, the audience for the
Cabbage Patch Dolls, were likely to be confused that the parodic Topps Chewing Gum
cards showed Cabbage Patch Dolls. That is unlikely, since cards with images on them
do not resemble soft cuddly dolls.
In addition, some “parodic” junior marks are not very creative, such as DUMB
STARBUCKS, and courts may find that they are not protected as parody. Evaluating
creativity is a difficult task, though, as creativity, to some extent, is in the eye of the
beholder. If the junior mark owner’s use is not parodic, is it unprotected or might there
the Court's equal division. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
Suffice it to say now that parody has an obvious claim to transformative value, as Acuff–
Rose itself does not deny. Like less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, it can provide
social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.
We thus line up with the courts that have held that parody, like other comment or criticism,
may claim fair use under § 107.
See, e. g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435–40 (9th Cir. 1986) ("When Sonny Sniffs Glue," a
parody of "When Sunny Gets Blue," is fair use); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482
F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) ("I Love Sodom," a "Saturday
Night Live" television parody of "I Love New York," is fair use). Judicial decisions prior to enactment
of the Copyright Act of 1976, which codified the fair use defense, had established that parody could be
fair use. See generally, PATRY, supra note 82.
84 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
85 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569.
86 See generally, PATRY, supra note 81 (tracing the fair use doctrine to English cases and
identifying its first recognition under U.S. law in Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, 9. F. Cas.
342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
87 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569.
88 See MCCARTHY, supra note 35, at § 31:154 (providing examples of infringing parodies,
illustrating how courts confuse likelihood of confusion with dilution analysis).
89 Id.
90 Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1032-33
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (copyright and trademark infringement claimed and proved).
91 Id. at 1038 (likelihood of confusion standard for trademark infringement satisfied, so parody
was not protected).
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be further fair use considerations that would save dumb parodies from being banned?
Congress and/or the courts should define parody and should recognize First
Amendment rights to make fun of senior marks when the junior mark does not rise to
the level of the parody concept developed for copyright law.
IV. PARODY CASELAW
A. Generally
This section provides a brief overview and history of parody in IP law, summarizes
some classic trademark parody cases, and reviews some trademark parody cases
decided since passage of the TDRA. 92 Parody in trademark law is a fairly heavily
litigated legal area with entertaining stories. Many U.S. courts treat parody as a form
of speech that is protected under the First Amendment and as a limitation on an IP
owner’s exclusive right to writings and trademarks. 93 When Congress enacts a statute
that affects IP law, particularly copyright and trademark, courts might reconsider
whether the prior parody case law is still effective.
This happened in 1994 for copyright’s fair use doctrine when the Supreme Court
considered whether parody could be fair use of a copyright even though the 1976 Act
did not refer to it.94 Congress, in the Copyright Act of 1976,95 had codified the judicially
created fair use doctrine, but the statute did not mention parody as a type of fair use. 96
The Supreme Court recognized fair use protection for parody in copyright law in its
1994 Campbell97 decision. The Court confirmed that fair use in copyright law included
parody, even though the 1976 Act’s fair use provision 98 did not mention it.99 Similarly,
the Supreme Court confirmed the right to make parodic use of a well-known senior
mark under trademark law and the FTDA in Moseley v. V. Secret (Moseley I).100 The
Court acknowledged the fair use defense under the former FTDA as the method for
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
93 See e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“This Court has only once
before even considered whether parody may be fair use, and that time issued no opinion because of
the Court's equal division. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom,
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958)”). See generally, PATRY, supra
note 82, 6–17.
94 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994).
95 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. (2012).
96 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
97 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594.
98 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012):
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
The list of uses is illustrative, so parodic use could be permitted, even though parody is not on
the list of illustrative uses.
99 Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579–80 (1994) (“We thus line up with the courts
that have held that parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107.”)
100 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003).
92
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protecting society’s and the junior user’s First Amendment interests. It relied on prior
case law to affirm its interpretation of the FTDA. The FTDA did not mention parody
as a fair use, but prior and subsequent trademark opinions have recognized it.
The trademark dilution proof standard and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
it led to Congressional enactment of the TDRA. Moseley I is briefly described here.
Victor and Cathy Moseley opened VICTOR’S SECRET, selling lingerie and adult
novelties in a small town in Kentucky. When Victoria’s Secret complained, they
changed the name to VICTOR’S LITTLE SECRET. Victoria’s Secret was not satisfied
with the modification and sued to defend its trademark. Victoria’s Secret claimed the
Moseley’s infringed the VICTORIA’S SECRET mark and diluted its mark in violation
of the FTDA. Victoria’s Secret neither showed likelihood of consumer confusion nor
actual dilution of its famous mark. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict among the circuits as to whether the FTDA required proof of actual
dilution or whether a likelihood of dilution is sufficient to obtain an injunction. The
Court ruled that the FDTA required actual proof of dilution, based on a literal reading
of the statute.101 The Court noted that other federal trademark laws and a number of
state trademark laws refer to the likelihood of dilution, but that the FTDA did not
incorporate that standard. The Court qualified its holding by saying that the senior
mark owner does not have to show actual lost sales or profits, but the mere fact that
consumers will associate the senior mark with the junior mark does not preclude the
junior mark owner’s right to parody the senior mark. 102
Part of the Moseley I decision was invalidated by Congress when in 2006 it enacted
the TDRA, specifying that the senior mark holder had the burden of showing likelihood
of dilution rather than the Supreme Court’s requirement of actual dilution. 103 The
TDRA is unique in naming parody as a defense to dilution, but the statutory defense
is limited to junior mark uses that do not use the parody as a source indicator. In
addition, under the TDRA noncommercial uses of the senior mark are a defense to
dilution. Some courts still consider parody a defense to both infringement and dilution
even when the junior mark holder’s use is as a source indicator or brand parody. 104
The next section summarizes the status of trademark parody law prior to passage of
the TDRA through review of some of the pre-2006 trademark parody cases. As the
post-TDRA cases show, many courts believe the prior cases are still reflective of
trademark parody law, notwithstanding the TDRA’s limitation of the parody defense
to noncommercial uses of the senior mark by the junior mark holder.

101 Id. at 434 (“[D]irect evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if
actual dilution can reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence -- the obvious case is one where
the junior and senior marks are identical.”)
102 Id.
103 Id. at 433 (actual dilution must be shown). The Court, however, made clear that this was not
much different than the likelihood of confusion standard under traditional trademark law. “Of course,
that does not mean that the consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or profits, must
also be proved.” Id. at 433–434.
104 See generally, Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12.
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B. Trademark and Parody Tradition
Jordan Blanke, professor of Computer Information Systems and Law, in his 2004
article on Moseley I provided an insightful review of trademark parody cases. 105 Some
cases are referenced herein in order to show the judicial treatment in place prior to the
FTDA and the TDRA, both of which created the federal cause of action for dilution.
Under traditional trademark infringement, the plaintiff has to show there is a
likelihood of consumer confusion in order to prevail. With good parody there is little
or no consumer confusion, so parody was protected as a factor in considering likelihood
of confusion, but not as a defense in itself. As already explained, parody in a limited
application is acknowledged as a defense to dilution under the TDRA.
Blanke treated “sex related” parody cases separately, which is a distinction also
in at least one post-TDRA case.106 First, in Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,107 the Second Circuit found that the use of the cheerleader
costume in an X-rated film was not a parody and was infringing. Second, in the
GENITAL ELECTRIC case108 the court found trademark infringement for a t-shirt
bearing the above words written to look like GENERAL ELECTRIC. 109 Third, in the
POPPIN FRESH case Screw magazine showed Pillsbury’s Poppin’ Fresh and Poppie
Fresh dough characters in sex acts. The court banned the parody on the grounds of
dilution under state law: it did not use trademark infringement due to there being no
likelihood of confusion.110 Last was High Society Magazine’s parody of L.L. Bean
entitled L.L. Bean’s Back-to-School-Sex-Catalog, which the court found not to be an
infringement and not to be dilution. The court distinguished Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders and General Electric, both of which had found dilution:
First, they all involved unauthorized commercial uses of another’s
trademark. Second, none of those cases involved a defendant using a
plaintiff’s trademark as a vehicle for an editorial or artistic parody. In
contrast to the cases cited, the instant defendant used plaintiff’s mark solely
for noncommercial purposes. Appellant’s parody constitutes an editorial or

Blanke, supra note 50, at 1059–73.
In V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010) [Moseley II], the court held
that Congress intended to treat sex–related parodic marks as unprotected. The dissent argued that
the statute did no such thing. Sex is not mentioned in the TDRA, so the dissent is correct.
107 Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202–203 (2d Cir.
1979).
108 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., No. 79-1815, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9197, at *2, 4–5 (D.
Mass. Oct. 12, 1979).
109 The court decided the case under a straight infringement theory. In the words of the court, “I
find that General Electric's distinctive and widely–recognized trademark is valid and worthy of
protection. I find that there is great probability of confusion among the general public of plaintiff's
trademarks and defendant's imitation. Accordingly, issuance of a preliminary injunction is warranted
…” Id. at 4. In the brief opinion, the court did not analyze blurring, tarnishment, or parody. The
court did not even mention the First Amendment, however, it did mention that the defendant
contended that he was lampooning the General Electric mark. Emerson concludes that it was because
the message primarily had a commercial purpose, “i.e., to sell the joke, rather than to make the joke.”
See Emerson, supra note 50, at 488.
110 Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 125–26 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
105
106
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artistic, rather than a commercial, use of plaintiff’s mark. The article was
labelled as “humor” and “parody” in the magazine’s table of contents.111
It offends the Constitution to use a dilution statute to prevent the defendant’s
parodic use of a trademark when the defendant is engaged in a protected form of
expression.112 Even though parody is often offensive, it still deserves substantial
freedom.113 “Denying parodists the opportunity to poke fun at symbols and names
which have become woven into the fabric of our daily life, would constitute a serious
curtailment of a protected form of expression.” 114 The L.L. Bean decision signals that
some courts have more respect for First Amendment freedoms even when they involve
sexual material. It does not, however, directly help junior mark holders who engage
in brand parody, which is commercial and is a source indicator.
Finally, Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm115 combined sex, drugs, and violence.
Defendant used VELVEEDA for websites that contained graphic sexuality and
illustrations of drug use and drug paraphernalia.116 The court held that VELVEEDA,
being similar to VELVEETA, probably tarnished VELVEETA.117 Sometimes litigants
hurt their own cases, and Helm did so because many of his statements contradicted
his First Amendment claim.118
In several brand parody type cases, courts reached differing results. First, Jim
Henson created a Muppet character called SPA’AM, and Hormel, the maker of SPAM,
sued and lost on both its infringement and dilution claims. 119 The court felt that
customers of SPAM and SPA’AM would not be confused. Both the Muppets and SPAM
are well known marks. As to dilution based on blurring, the court held that the parody
would strengthen rather than weaken the link between the name and the senior mark
holder. Jim Henson did not plan to market the word SPA’AM by itself, but only to use
it in conjunction with the Muppet character. Tarnishment, on the other hand, occurs
when a mark is “‘linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an
unwholesome or unsavory context,” with the result that “the public will associate the
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987).
Id.
113 Id. at 33 (citing Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964), a music
copyright parody case).
114 Id. at 34.
115 Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
116 Id. The websites are www.cheesygraphics.com and www.courtofporn.com. As of June 24,
2014, the second site is no longer available.
117 Id. at 949.
118 Id. at 948. Stuart Helm appeared both pro se and through a law firm. In the words of the
court:
Mr. Helm's claim that his use of "VelVeeda" is a parody of Kraft … contradicts his
statements in both his deposition and in his in-court testimony that his use of
"VelVeeda" is not meant to be an opinion, commentary or parody of Kraft or
Velveeta. … [P]erhaps most fatal to Mr. Helm's claim that he is parodying
Velveeta(R) and should be protected, are his admissions to the contrary. He stated
twice that he never parodied Kraft or Velveeta(R) and that his use of the name
"VelVeeda" is not a parody of the Kraft cheese products.
Id. at 952–53. Additionally Helm testified that his nickname is not important for conducting any of
the transactions that occur on his website. Id. at 955.
119 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 508 (2d Cir. 1996). On appeal,
the only issue remaining between the parties was the marketing of merchandise.
111
112
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lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiff's unrelated
goods.”120 The Muppet character SPA’AM was not unsavory, but was likeable and
would not create any negative associations. Additionally, Jim Henson’s products
would not be in direct competition with those of Hormel.
Second, the maker of LARDASHE jeans was sued by Jordache and the Tenth
Circuit permitted the parody, again considering both infringement and dilution. 121
Third, Blanke noted that the Eighth Circuit is more protective of senior mark
holders122 and that it banned MUTANT OF OMAHA t-shirts as both infringing and
dilutive.123 Fourth, Lucasfilm, the maker of STAR WARS movies, sued the maker of
the pornographic film STARBALLZ in the Ninth Circuit 124 and lost, the public interest
in free or artistic speech trumping trademark infringement and dilution. Fifth,
Mattel’s BARBIE has also been parodied and Mattel lost its trademark infringement
and dilution suit when she was parodied in a song. 125
Finally, the case where the judicial analysis was most disturbing was the
CONSUMER WHORE parody of Starbucks’ mermaid where the court banned sale of
parodic memorabilia.126 Cartoonist Kieron Dwyer created a parody of Starbucks’s
ubiquitous mermaid logo and posted it to his Web site. His logo changed the name
encircling the mermaid from “Starbucks Coffee” to “Consumer Whore.” He also
changed the stars to dollar signs, opened the mermaid’s eyes, placed a cup of coffee in
one hand and a cell phone in the other, and gave her nipples and a navel ring. On his
Web site, he advertised T-shirts, bumper stickers, and a comic book, all carrying the
logo. He sold about 200 of the T-shirts. Starbucks sued Dwyer for, among other things,
copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and trademark dilution by
tarnishment. The District Court for the Northern District of California issued a
preliminary injunction prohibiting Dwyer from posting the logo to his Web site and
selling any items containing the logo.127 The ruling is consistent with sex-referring
cases as receiving the least protection, but is disturbing in that a clear parody received
no First Amendment protection.
Variation in result occurs among circuits and among subjects, with sexual parody
being the least protected topic. Generally, it appears that the sex-related parody cases
are given less leeway than politically satiric cases. In general, likelihood of consumer
confusion is irrelevant for a dilution claim. So in dilution cases it is not as clear how
parody should be considered. Many courts perform both a likelihood of confusion and
a dilution analysis in infringement claims, an analysis that McCarthy identifies as
unnecessary;128 if there is likelihood of consumer confusion, there is no need to also
Id. at 507 (quoting Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1483 (10th Cir. 1987).
122 Blanke, supra note 50, at 1074 (“Clearly, one cannot reconcile the decisions of the Second,
Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. If the cases from the Eighth Circuit had been brought before the
Second, Fourth, or Tenth Circuits (or vice versa), the results would have been the reverse.”).
123 Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987).
124 Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899–900 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
125 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002).
126 See Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice Due To Settlement at 1, Starbucks Corp. v.
Dwyer, No. 3:00-CV-1499 MMC (N.D. Cal., filed Apr. 24, 2000). See Kieron Dwyer, Greed Sucks!,
KIERONDWYER.COM, http://kierondwyer.com/LCD/GREED.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015) (voicing
his viewpoint on Starbucks).
127 Blanke, supra note 50, at 1085–86.
128 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, at § 24:72.
120
121
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consider dilution. Each circuit has a system for determining likelihood of confusion in
a trademark infringement case.129
It appears that parody continued to be protected in trademark law even after
passage of the FTDA in 1995, but clearly courts vary according to their own reactions
to the parody. It is also important that this review of pre-2006 parody cases end on a
Starbucks case, since that company is Fielder’s target. Fielder’s case may involve
parody, but it is nothing more than adding the word DUMB above STARBUCKS. That
is not very edgy, biting, or satiric, and it seems to make little social comment on
Starbucks as a senior mark holder. In fact, if anything it is making fun of trademark
law and the parody exception. So the answer to whether “dumb” parody is protected
is unknown.
C. Trademark and Parody after the TDRA of 2006130
This section reviews some trademark infringement and/or dilution cases decided
by federal courts since enactment of the TDRA in 2006. Some of the cases involve
trademark infringement, but not dilution, so they do not consider parody under the
TDRA. The first three cases were decided by appellate courts, while the rest were
decided by district courts.
1. Moseley II
The dispute between the Moseleys and Victoria’s Secret continued after the TDRA
overturned the Supreme Court’s decision in Moseley I.131 The District Court granted
an injunction prohibiting Victor Moseley from naming his store VICTOR’S LITTLE
SECRET and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision. 132 Under the new standard
dictated by the TDRA, the senior mark holder did not have the burden of showing
actual dilution, but only likelihood of dilution. The Sixth Circuit agreed with Victoria’s
Secret that the Moseleys diluted its mark by tarnishment in violation of the TDRA. 133
The Sixth Circuit created a presumption that if the junior mark is used to “sell sex
129 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1581 (2006) (thirteen circuits and thirteen multifactor tests).
130 See generally Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, 109th Cong. (2006), (codified at Lanham Act
§ 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 392 n. 3
(6th Cir. 2010) (Moore, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (emphasized added) (dissenting opinion
reviewing H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 5):
Witnesses at the [legislative] hearings focused on the standard of harm threshold
articulated in Mosely [sic]. For example, a representative of the International
Trademark Association observed that ‘[b]y the time measurable, provable damage
to the mark has occurred much time has passed, the damage has been done, and
the remedy, which is injunctive relief, is far less effective.’ The Committee endorses
this position. The Mosely [sic] standard creates an undue burden for trademark
holders who contest diluting uses and should be revised.
131 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 435–36 (2003).
132 V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 389–390 (“The Moseleys do not have a right to use the
word "secret" in their mark.”)
133 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c) (2012). The TDRA recognizes dilution by both blurring and tarnishment.

[14:143 2015]

Parody in Trademark Law: Dumb Starbucks Makes
Trademark Law Look Dumb

167

related products, [it] is likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic
association between the two.”134
The Moseley II decision was not unanimous. Judge Moore’s dissenting opinion
argued that Victoria’s Secret did not provide sufficient evidence that Victor’s Little
Secret would tarnish its mark. She agreed that there is a clear association between
the marks. She felt the significant question is whether that association is likely to
harm Victoria's Secret's reputation. She felt that Victoria’s Secret failed to show that
it would be harmed.135
Judge Moore’s dissent shows respect for the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Moseley
I and recognizes the exact change that the TDRA made to the Supreme Court’s holding
without making inferences and/or presumptions that may affect First Amendment law.
The majority opinion created a new speech censorship law by misinterpreting
tarnishment and the TDRA. Both the senior and junior mark holders are effectively
“selling sex,” which perhaps should have been explained in the opinion. The Sixth
Circuit cited eight cases from various circuits that found tarnishment when the similar
sounding junior mark was “used to sell sex-related products.”136 But the dissent
answered that none of those eight cases involved both senior and junior mark holders
being in the business of selling sex, which is the situation here. 137 Besides, the TDRA
134 V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 385. The court also embraced a puritanical tarnishment
standard for the TDRA, even though the TDRA does not mention sex. Id. at 387.
There appears to be a clearly emerging consensus in the case law . . . that the
creation of an "association" between a famous mark and lewd or bawdy sexual
activity disparages and defiles the famous mark and reduces the commercial value
of its selling power. This consensus stems from an economic prediction about
consumer taste and how the predicted reaction of conventional consumers in our
culture will affect the economic value of the famous mark.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 387–88.
135 Id. at 391–95 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Victoria's Secret's evidence of tarnishment includes . . . an affidavit from Army
Colonel John E. Baker stating that he ’was…offended by [the] defendants' use of
[Victoria's Secret's] trademark to promote…unwholesome, tawdry merchandise,’
such as ‘adult' novelties and gifts,’ and that since his ‘wife…and …daughter …shop
at Victoria's Secret, [he] was further dismayed by [the] defendants' effort to
associate itself with . . . a store frequented by members of [his] family.’
Id. at 391 (Moore, J., dissenting). The dissent further stated that there was no evidence that
Moseley’s use would taint their image.
Yet evidence that the junior mark is likely to undermine or alter the positive
associations of the senior mark--i.e., evidence that the junior mark is likely to harm
the reputation of the senior mark--is precisely the showing required under the plain
language of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) to prove dilution by tarnishment.
Id. At 392 (Moore, J., dissenting).
[I]n fact, when reviewing the exact same evidentiary record, the Supreme Court
explicitly noted that Victoria's Secret's offer of proof included no evidence that
"Victor's Little Secret" affected Baker's positive impressions of Victoria's
Secret . . . In short, Victoria's Secret has presented no probative evidence that
anyone is likely to think less of Victoria's Secret as a result of "Victor's Little Secret"
and cannot therefore prevail on its claim of dilution by tarnishment.
Id. at 392–93 (Moore, J., dissenting).
136 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2010).
137 Id. at 395–96.
The burden–of–proof problem, the developing case law, and the Restatement
(Third) of Trademarks in § 25 (particularly subsection g) should now be interpreted,

[14:143 2015] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

168

says nothing about sex related products, so there would be no reason for the majority
to create a presumption of tarnishment if the subject involves sex. The Moseley II
decision goes beyond the language of the TDRA and limits First Amendment sexual
content speech. It does not appear that Congress intended that result when it enacted
the TDRA.
2. Charbucks
In Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc.,138 a New Hampshire coffee
company Black Bear Micro Roastery marketed dark roasted coffee it called
CHARBUCKS.139 Black Bear’s trade dress was dissimilar to Starbucks’, so there was
little likelihood of confusion. Starbucks requested that Black Bear cease marketing
CHARBUCKS, Black Bear declined, and Starbucks filed suit claiming trademark
infringement, federal dilution, state dilution, and state unfair competition. 140
The litigation resulted in seven judicial decisions, six of which are briefly
summarized hereafter. During the twelve years of this litigation, the statutory law
changed; the 1995 FTDA was replaced by the 2006 TDRA. In 2005, Judge Swain ruled
in favor of Black Bear on the following claims: federal trademark infringement, federal
unfair competition, federal trademark dilution, state trademark dilution, and unfair

we think, to create a kind of rebuttable presumption, or at least a very strong
inference, that a new mark used to sell sex–related products is likely to tarnish a
famous mark if there is a clear semantic association between the two.
Id. at 395–96.
138 There are seven published opinions in this case, which began in 2001. The authors did not
count the first one because it was a denial of motions to dismiss. They are listed here from earliest to
most recent. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19239, *9
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying cross motions for summary judgment on trademark infringement, state and
federal dilution, and state unfair competition claims); 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35578, *30 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (Starbucks I) (judgment for defendant on all state and federal claims); 477 F.3d 765, 766 (2d
Cir. 2007) (Starbucks II) (vacating and remanding to apply the TDRA); 559 F. Supp. 2d 472, 481
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Starbucks III) (reinstating district court decision and judgment from Starbucks I);
588 F.3d 97, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (Starbucks IV) (affirming, vacating, and remanding: “we a fortiori
agree with the District Court's ultimate conclusion that there is no likelihood of confusion "as to
source, sponsorship, or association of [Charbucks] with the Starbucks mark”); 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
148081, *15 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Starbucks V) (denying relief under the TDRA); 736 F.3d 198, 213 (2d
Cir. 2013) (Starbucks VI) (affirming district court’s finding for defendant).
139 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35578, at *6–7
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Indeed, one of Black Bear's inspirations for using the term "Charbucks" was the
public perception that Starbucks tended to roast its product more darkly than any of the other major
roasters.”)
See
What’s
It
All
About?,
BLACK
BEAR
COFFEE,
http://www.blackbearcoffee.com/Starbucks/What%27s_it_all_about.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
This is Black Bear Coffee’s website. The statement reviews the history of the term CHARBUCKS to
designate dark roasted coffee. The owner of Boston’s Coffee Connection shops sold to Starbucks, which
changed the coffee to darker roasted beans. So people pejoratively called dark roasted coffee
CHARBUCKS. Black Bear adopted the term for its dark roasted coffee. Id.
140 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19239, *9 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). Many of the parody trademark cases involve the same claims: federal trademark infringement,
state unfair competition law violations, state and federal dilution. The claims tend to overlap and
possibly create judicial waste. Id.
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competition under the common law.141 (Starbucks I) The Second Circuit remanded for
Judge Swain to apply the TDRA (Starbucks II). 142 Judge Swain applied the TDRA and
found for Black Bear on all counts (Starbucks III).143 Starbucks again appealed and
the Second Circuit, while seemingly agreeing with Judge Swain’s application of the
law, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded once again (Starbucks IV). 144 The
Second Circuit did determine that the TDRA changed the law and it clarified how the
TDRA limited use of the parody defense in dilution claims. 145 In Starbucks V, Judge
Swain corrected the law, as directed by the Second Circuit, but continued to hold for
Black Bear.146 Starbucks appealed yet again. In Starbucks VI, the Second Circuit
affirmed Judge Swain’s prior opinion, not even mentioning parody, and finding that
Starbucks had the burden of showing likelihood of dilution and it had not done so. 147
The Starbucks VI opinion reviewed the prior five opinions and explained the Second
Circuit federal dilution law under the TDRA’s blurring factors. 148 The reasoning by
both the district court and the Second Circuit were reflective of prior case law and
provided courts with a clear interpretation of how the TDRA and its limited recognition
141
142

Id.
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765, 765 (2d Cir. 2007) (Starbucks

II).
143 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 472, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(Starbucks III) (“[J]udgment will be entered in Defendant's favor on all counts.”).
144 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2009), affirming in
part and vacating in part (Starbucks IV) (Judge Miner).
Upon its finding that the marks were not substantially similar, however, the
District Court concluded that ’[t]his dissimilarity alone is sufficient to defeat
[Starbucks'] blurring claim, and in any event, this factor at a minimum weighs
strongly against [Starbucks] in the dilution analysis.’ We conclude that the District
Court erred to the extent it required "substantial" similarity between the marks,
and, in this connection, we note that the court may also have placed undue
significance on the similarity factor in determining the likelihood of dilution in its
alternative analysis.
Id.
145 Id.
146 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148081, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
147 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 2013) (Starbucks
VI).
148 Id. at 201–03. The court said:
[I]n 2001 Starbucks started this action claiming, among other things, trademark
dilution in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127.. . . . The District Court
determined that there was neither actual dilution, which would establish a
violation of federal trademark law, nor a likelihood of dilution, which would
establish a violation of New York trademark law. Starbucks appealed. While the
appeal was pending, Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
("TDRA"), which amended the FTDA to clarify that the owner of a famous mark
seeking an injunction need prove only that the defendant's mark "is likely to cause
dilution . . . of the famous mark.
Id. at 201–02. The court held:
[T]he District Court held that Starbucks had failed to meet its burden of showing
that it was entitled to injunctive relief: [T]he Charbucks marks are…not likely to
impair the distinctiveness of the famous Starbucks marks. In other words,
[Starbucks] has failed to carry its burden of proving that [Black Bear's] use of its
marks…is likely to cause dilution by blurring.
Id. at 205 (quoting Starbucks V, supra note 138).
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of parody should fit into future judicial analyses. It also explored what the senior mark
holder must show to make a case for “likelihood of dilution.”
3. Chewy Vuiton
A 2007 Fourth Circuit decision Louis Vuitton Mallatier (LVM) v. Haute Diggity
Dogg,149 was similar to the Charbucks opinion in its broad strokes, but different in
specifics. LVM added copyright infringement to its state and federal trademark,
dilution, and unfair competition claims.150 Haute Diggity Dogg sold dog toys and other
pet supplies. The toys parodized famous designers and people, like Vincent van
Gogh.151 The toy that bothered LVM was CHEWY VUITON, a parody of a Vuitton
purse, but clearly a toy. The court interpreted and applied the TDRA. It agreed with
the district court’s findings of no trademark infringement and no dilution, but used
different reasoning than the trial court.152
The court recited the judicial definition of parody, which is not defined in statutory
law. For trademark purposes, "[a] 'parody' is defined as a simple form of entertainment
conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the trademark with the
idealized image created by the mark's owner. … A parody must convey two
simultaneous--and contradictory--messages: that it is the original, but also that it is
not the original and is instead a parody." 153 This second message must not only
differentiate the alleged parody from the original but must also communicate some
articulable element of satire, ridicule, joking, or amusement. Thus, "[a] parody relies
upon a difference from the original mark, presumably a humorous difference, in order
to produce its desired effect."154
The Fourth Circuit found CHEWY VUITON was a parody. 155 There was not a
likelihood of confusion for trademark infringement. 156 On the dilution claim, the court
wisely explained that even if the parody is used commercially and is not protected by
the TDRA’s non-commercial parody defense, courts may still consider the junior mark
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 252 (4th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 256. There were nine claims arising from the same facts. The list of state and federal
claims reveals the problem with overlapping legal protection between state and federal law and
between between trademark and copyright law. See generally, Lee B. Burgunder, The Scoop on Betty
Boop: A Proposal to Limit Overreaching Trademarks, 32 LOY. L. A. ENT. L. REV. 257 (2012) (use of
trademark which lasts in perpetuity to replace copyright protection when the latter has expired).
151
Products
are
sold
by
Designer
Doggy
and
can
be
viewed
at
http://www.designerdoggy.com/brands/Haute–Diggity–Dog.html. DESIGNER DOGGY,
http://www.designerdoggy.com/brands/Haute-Diggity-Dog.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
152 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 507 F.3d at 256–57 (4th Cir. 2007).
153 Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, No. 2:13-CV-53, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57431, at *56–57
(E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2014) (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir.
1987); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Cliff
Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989)).
154 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 507 F.3d at 260 (quoting Jordache Enterprise, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld,
Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987).
155 Id. at 261. “We conclude that the PETA criteria are amply satisfied in this case and that the
‘Chewy Vuiton' dog toys convey ‘just enough of the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate
the point of parody,' but stop well short of appropriating the entire marks that LVM claims.” Id.
(quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.2d 359, 266 (4th Cir. 2001).
156 Id. at 263.
149
150
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holder’s general right to parody the senior mark. 157 The drafting of the TDRA to
include a very limited parody fair use defense in only non-commercial uses by the
junior mark holder could have been interpreted as Congress’ intent to expand dilution
to commercial parodies. This opinion demonstrates how courts will preserve First
Amendment speech rights even when a statute does not so provide. This opinion paves
the way for continued protection of the junior mark holder’s right to associate its mark
with the senior mark holder as a form of social commentary or even mere
entertainment.
The rest of the post-TDRA cases are from district courts.
4. NAACP
In Radiance Foundation, Inc. v. National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP),158 plaintiff Radiance, an anti-abortion group, was denied
declaratory judgment and found to be liable for trademark infringement and dilution
of the NAACP’s trademark when it published on its website articles using the name
“National Association for the Abortion of Colored People.”159 The court found likelihood
of confusion over use of the imitative name. 160 Successful parody should not confuse
the public, so the court decided this was not a parody, hence not entitled to protection
as such.161 It also found dilution by tarnishment because the use of the name
“insinuates a stance of abortion that the NAACP has deliberately avoided.” 162
Radiance claimed a First Amendment right to say what it thinks about abortion. The
court agreed, but said it could not lie or mislead about what the NAACP says about
abortion.163 So it was tarnishment by misleading the public that the NAACP takes
any stand on abortion, which it does not. 164 The court used the TDRA’s limitation on
Id. at 266–67.
Under the statute's plain language, parodying a famous mark is protected by the
fair use defense only if the parody is not ‘a designation of source for the person's
own goods or services.’ The TDRA, however, does not require a court to ignore the
existence of a parody that is used as a trademark, and it does not preclude a court
from considering parody as part of the circumstances to be considered for
determining whether the plaintiff has made out a claim for dilution by
blurring . . . .Thus, it would appear that a defendant's use of a mark as a parody is
relevant to the overall question of whether the defendant's use is likely to impair
the famous mark's distinctiveness . . . Indeed, by making the famous mark an object
of the parody, a successful parody might actually enhance the famous mark's
distinctiveness by making it an icon . . . In sum, while a defendant's use of a parody
as a mark does not support a "fair use" defense, it may be considered in determining
whether the plaintiff–owner of a famous mark has proved its claim that the
defendant's use of a parody mark is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the
famous mark.
158 Radiance Found., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57431, at *4.
159 Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, No. 2:13-CV-53, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57431, at *3 (E.D.
Va. Apr. 24, 2014).
160 Id. at *23.
161 Id. at *57.
162 Id. at *25–26.
163 Id. at *65.
164 Id. at *66.
157

[14:143 2015] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

172

parody to non-commercial uses of a senior mark to find for the NAACP; it said
Radiance was making a commercial use of the mark, so the TDRA’s parody defense
would not work here.165 That holding could be interpreted as the Tenth Circuit
banning trademark parody that is commercial. Hopefully the case will not be used in
this manner, but only to explain that commercial uses of a senior mark can be made
by non-profit groups.166 A further problem with the court’s reasoning is that it found
both infringement and dilution, when others realize that the senior mark holder should
not have a cause of action for dilution if it already has shown infringement through
likelihood of confusion.
5. THE SITUATION v. THE FITCHUATION
In MPS Entertainment, LLC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,167 Abercrombie
& Fitch (A&F) had requested that Michael “The Situation” Sorrentino, a character in
MTV's Jersey Shore, cease wearing A&F clothes on the TV show. At the same time
A&F had been marketing a parody t-shirt that it called the FITCHUATION, making
fun of the actor’s self-styled name THE SITUATION. A&F alleged the show depicted
the characters “in an unwholesome view”168 that reflected poorly on the A&F
reputation. A&F had even offered to pay the actors not to wear A&F clothes. 169
Sorrentino sued A&F for trademark infringement and dilution under federal and state
law. The court entered summary judgment in favor of A&F’s parodic t-shirt. This
would be a weak case for dilution since THE SITUATION may not be sufficiently
famous to obtain federal dilution protection.
6. Louis Vuitton v. Hyundai
In Louis Vuitton Malletier (LVM) v. Hyundai Motor America,170 Hyundai aired a
TV commercial that “poked fun at these symbols of 'old' luxury to distinguish them
from [Hyundai] in an effort to challenge consumers to rethink what it means for a
product to be luxurious.”171 One of the symbols of old luxury was a “basketball
decorated with a distinctive pattern resembling the famous trademarks of
plaintiff….”172 LVM sued for dilution under state and federal law, infringement under
federal law, and unfair competition under state law, claiming a right to money
damages for “willful dilution.”173 The Hyundai designers claimed they were not
parodying LVM, but were “challeng[ing] consumers to rethink what it means for a
165 Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, No. 2:13-CV-53, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57431, at *78–79
(E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2014).
166 Id. at *79.
167 MPS Entm't, LLC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 11–24110–CIV–O'SULLIVAN, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91193, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
168 Id. at *3.
169 Id. at *7–8.
170 Malletier v. Hyundai Motor Am., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42795, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
171 Id. at *5.
172 Id. at *2.
173 Id. at *11–12.
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product to be luxurious."174 That made the purpose satire rather than parody, which
the court assumed is not protected by the First Amendment in a trademark dilution
claim. One interpretation of the court’s decision is that making a social comment on
old wealth and luxury as compared to the trendy new auto being advertised was not a
fair use.175
This case is disturbing. An entertaining commercial was banned because
Hyundai used references to famous marks to make a comment to consumers on
Hyundai’s Sonata being luxurious in a different way than traditional luxury. The case
is similar to the hypothetical DUMB STARBUCKS in that Fielder was not parodying
Starbucks, but was at most making a satiric comment on trademark parody law. The
value system espoused by this Second Circuit court comes dangerously close to being
censorship; people watching the commercial may make a subtle association between
Hyundai and LVM, but they certainly would not be confused by seeing a basketball
decorated like a LVM purse. The use of the basketball image would not likely dilute
LVM’s trademark, even though consumers might associate LVM with Hyundai.
7. Elf on the Shelf v. Elf off the Shelf
In CCA and B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc.,176 defendant made an adult parody of
plaintiff’s children’s book. Plaintiff claimed trademark infringement and dilution, plus
six other state and federal related claims. 177 The court determined the issue was
merely whether “it is likely that the average consumer of Plaintiff's book…will be
confused by the similarity of the book covers of THE ELF ON THE SHELF and Defendant's
purported parody, THE ELF OFF THE SHELF.”178 It is unclear whether the court
recognized that dilution does not need a showing of likelihood of confusion by
consumers. It did deny the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. 179 And it did
comment on plaintiff’s dilution claims. “Plaintiff cited an article in Publisher's Weekly
that reported that Elf Off is intended to ‘knock a holiday favorite off its perch.’ …
Defendant agrees that is precisely their goal, but says there is nothing naughty about
it.”180 Notably, the opinion combined a fair use in copyright claim and analysis in its
opinion.181 Without delving into whether the TDRA has altered parody considerations
in trademark dilution claims, the court chose to protect parody under First
Amendment free speech values. “With regard to the public interest, both trademark
and copyright law offer protection for parodic use of IP, consistent with the strong
public interest in protecting free speech and expression. Thus, in a case presenting a

Id. at *49.
Id. at 75 “Based on this record…no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the Louis
Vuitton–style marks shown in the ‘Luxury’ ad could constitute ‘use in connection with…identifying
and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the
famous mark owner.” Id. at *55 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii)).
176 CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1317.
181 Id. at 1322–1324.
174
175
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parody that criticizes an original work, the public interest in protecting that expression
is of the highest level.”182
8. Protect Marriage
In ProtectMarriage.com v. Courage Campaign,183 plaintiff political group
promoting marriage as only unions between heterosexual couples had a logo depicting
a four person heterosexual family. Defendant political group promoting legalization of
same sex marriage had a similar logo that showed a four person family with same sex
parents.184 The court protected defendant’s use of plaintiff’s logo as a parody. 185 The
case did not use the TDRA, perhaps because the mark is not sufficiently famous to
support a dilution claim.
9. Lettuce Entertain You
In Lettuce Entertain You Enterprises, Inc. v. Leila Sophia AR, LLC,186 plaintiff
LEYE, a Chicago business, used LETTUCE marks to identify its restaurant and
catering businesses.187 Defendant named its Chicago restaurant Lettuce mix and was
asked to remove the sign by LEYE. Defendant replaced the sign with a banner saying
"Let us be!" and a lettuce head image, and LEYE sued. The banner was permitted to
remain and the court dismissed the suit. 188 The defendant made an effective use of
parody. It may develop in dilution and infringement cases that the courts take one
more analytical step considering the junior holder’s purpose for using the mark, with
highly protected speech like political, social, and artistic being more protected against
a trademark infringement or dilution claim. This is similar to Fielder’s argument and
he called his shop art.
10. Hershey
In The Hershey Company v. Art Van Furniture,189 defendant, advertising for its
furniture store, placed an image of a sofa being unwrapped from a candy wrapper on
the side of the furniture company’s delivery truck. There was no likelihood of confusion

182
183

Id. at 1330.
ProtectMarriage.com – Yes on 8 v. Courage Campaign, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1226 (E.D. Cal.

2010).
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1229.
186 Lettuce Entertain You Enters. v. Leila Sophia AR, LLC, 638 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896 (N.D. Ill.
2009).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 902.
189 Hershey Co. v. Art Van Furniture, Inc., No. 08–14463, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87509, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2008).
184
185
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by consumers. The court found presumptively dilution by blurring and granted a
preliminary injunction.190 The court applied Moseley II to explain its reasoning.
This case is similar to Lettuce, Hyundai (summaries above) and other cases
dealing with advertising and using consumers’ mental associations to sell one’s own
product. These cases are problematical because they are not necessarily parodic of the
senior mark holder; they merely create a mental association between the marks. They
use the senior mark to entice consumers by association. But to stop junior mark
holders from being able to do so by creating a cause of action for tarnishment or
blurring will make the world a more boring place. It is illogical that one can use parody
to protect junior marks that are mean, but not ones that create a cheerful
association.191 The court blurred dilution law when it justified its decision to find
dilution by referencing likelihood of confusion consumer protection. 192 Dilution law is
not established to protect consumers, but to protect the famous mark. Here the
HERSHEY mark was not blurred or tarnished.
11. BUTTWIPER
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Products, LLC,193 the court found a dog toy named
BUTTWIPER infringed the Budweiser mark, relying on survey evidence of likelihood
of confusion between the toy and Budweiser beer. There have been other dog toy cases
with the result that one can name its dog toy LOUIS’ CHEWIES, TOMMY
HOLEDIGGER, BARKBURY, and MANOLO BARKNIK, but not BUTTWIPER. 194
The court applied the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of trademark parody law which
is more protective of the senior mark holder and less protective of the First Amendment
and parody. It found trademark infringement, but not dilution. 195 There are definitely
litigation costs and issues of lack of consistency in law when it comes to marketing
parodic dog toys.
12. NAKED COWBOY
In Burck v. Mars,196 the Naked Cowboy Times Square street performer sued Mars
for its “animated cartoon advertisement on two oversized video billboards in Times
Square, featuring a blue M&M dressed exactly like The Naked Cowboy, wearing only
Id. at *2.
Id. at *41–42. “Defendant's ‘couch bar’ may be funny, but it is not biting; its resemblance to
Plaintiff's famous trade dress is too muted to poke fun, yet too transparent to evoke a generic candy
bar.” Id. This opinion bodes poorly for DUMB STARBUCKS, since the latter is not particularly biting
either.
192 Id. at *42. “Reducing the risk of customer confusion inherently serves the public interest. A
free market society depends on informed consumers for its well–being, and [t]rademark infringement,
by its very nature, adversely affects the public interest in the free flow of truthful commercial
information.” Id. at *43 (quotations omitted).
193 Anheuser–Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982–83 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
194 See Louis Vuitton Mallatier (LVM) v. Haute Diggity Dogg, 507 F.3d 252, 263 (4th Cir. 2007)
and Tommy Hilfiger Licensing v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
195 Anheuser–Busch, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 2d at 987–88.
196 Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
190
191
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a white cowboy hat, cowboy boots, and underpants, and carrying a guitar.” 197 It was
actually a right of publicity case, but NAKED COWBOY is a trade name and M&M
claimed parody, so the facts are relevant. M&M was permitted to keep the billboard
and the Naked Cowboy still plies his trade, all in Times Square.198
The court used copyright parody law and applied it in a trademark parody case,
which might be appropriate for Fielder regarding his DUMB STARBUCKS. He
claimed the shop was a work of art, so he was moving into the copyright realm, or at
least not distinguishing between the two. The only difference remaining is whether
DUMB is parodic; the Naked Cowboy M&M satisfied the court’s requirements to be a
parody.
13. Wal-Mart
In Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,199 Smith used terms such as WALOCAUST to
criticize and make fun of Wal-Mart on web-sites he created for that purpose.200 He
sold t-shirts through a site managed by CafePress called WAL-QAEDA.201 The court
held the words were parodies202 and dismissed the suit.203 On his website, Smith now
includes a nice notice thanking the court in northern Georgia for allowing him to
continue marketing his t-shirts and making fun of Wal-Mart.204
Several of the opinions summarized had considered the law on determining the
evidentiary value of survey evidence. The Wal-Mart court went into detail to review
how the survey was done, what was asked, and whether the conclusions were
accurate.205 Surveys do not always fare well when the court applies legal logic to testing
their evidentiary value. That happened here; the court found the survey was flawed
in regard to proving likelihood of confusion.206 Logically, people would not be confused
as to source.
In Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, the court also considered dilution by tarnishment.
After summarizing what tarnishment is, the court wrote, "However, tarnishment
caused merely by an editorial or artistic parody which satirizes [the complainant's]
product or its image is not actionable under an anti-dilution statute because of the free
speech protections of the First Amendment."207 It could well be the same with DUMB
STARBUCKS, even though it contains little redeemable social value.
It appears from the summaries of parody cases since 2006 when the TDRA became
effective, some of the courts have continued to apply their prior legal understanding of
parody’s permissible use in trademark usage, while at least one circuit, the Sixth
Circuit that decided Moseley, has decided not to protect parody if it has a sexual aspect
Id. at 448.
Id. at 458.
199 Smith v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
200 Id. at 1309.
201 Id. at 1311.
202 Id. at 1313.
203 Id. at 1340.
204 Walocaust, CAFEPRESS, http://www.cafepress.com/walocaust (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
205 Smith v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
206 Id. at 1335.
207 Id. at 1339.
197
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to it. Appendix II summarizes the findings in the above thirteen trademark cases
decided since 2006.
V. ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
Several law journal articles, both before and since passage of the TDRA, have
explored similar problems in trademark as those identified in the DUMB
STARBUCKS problem. This section summarizes and builds on some of the difficulties
that have been identified. Scholars and the authors have suggested making changes
to the law as well as ways to cope with the law as it is currently being administered.
A. Trademark Law Overprotects Famous Businesses
First, the current trademark law overprotects big businesses to the detriment of
small ones. This is true of the TDRA which provides famous mark holders with a cause
of action against junior mark holders for likelihood of dilution of the senior mark.
Trademark law has also expanded protection in its topical protection, covering odors,
colors, and more.208 One legal scholar identified this increased legal power of the senior
mark holder as a sort of incentivization to become a trademark bully. 209 The law
encourages senior mark holders to police their marks vigorously. It is noticeable how
diligently Starbucks polices its trademark while still presenting itself to the world as
a highly ethical and socially responsible company. The legal system incentivizes
Starbucks to police its trademark, or risk losing maximum protection. From
Starbucks’ viewpoint, it is enforcing its legal rights conscientiously. Yet to many
people this behavior appears to be bullying, 210 which seems unethical from a
consuming public perspective.

Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of Values and
Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427, 428 (2011). In the last seventy years, trademark
rights have expanded enormously. Many commentators believe this has led to an unjustified increase
in the rights and remedies available to trademark owners. This expansion has been approved and led
by trademark owners, Congress, and courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court.
209 Grinvald, supra note 10, at 638–640. The author named the section “The Fame Monster.” She
thinks fame and the law’s favoritist statute, the TDRA, inspires famous mark holders to bully junior
mark holders. The scope of legal protection for trademarks has expanded greatly in the last century.
From the recognition of new subject matter of trademarks to new causes of action, trademark owners
have benefited from additional protection. Trademark owners have pursued this protection because
of the increased importance of the brand in establishing and building goodwill, and expanding into
new product, service, and geographic markets, particularly with the advent of globalization and use
of the Internet. See also David Bollier, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL
CULTURE (2005) (documenting various bullying campaigns).
210 Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Aesthetic Functionality, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 155, 157–158
(2013). Diligent trademark owners – spurred by the structure and policy of trademark law and the
value of the brand – are motivated to vigorously protect their trademarks through policing efforts….
Notably, many trademark owners are successful not only in the marketplace, but also in obtaining
additional trademark protection through new legislation. Scholars and courts have criticized the
expanding nature of trademark protection, which may harm competition and impinge on socially
important values, such as free expression.
208
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B. Junior Mark Holders Might Have Undue Expenses in Defending.
Second, the junior mark holder has to bear the expense of defending a claim when
it may not have the financial ability to defend against the often much larger senior
mark holder. Defending against a dilution claim under the Lanham Act is by definition
defending against a large, well known, and probably wealthy senior mark holder. Such
companies are able to spend substantial amounts of money to police their marks. If
those who would push back at the expansive boundaries of the senior mark holder’s
right to stop a junior mark holder from parodying the senior mark are not financially
able to do so, the law will become one-sided.
Law professor and intellectual property attorney Leah Grinvald suggested that
one tool to push back against bullying senior mark holders is shaming. 211 She
summarized a case where the “little guy” stood up to the “big guy” and is still using his
mark. It was not a parody case, but her advice might have broad applicability. She
identified the senior mark holder’s behavior as bullying 212 and condemned it as
economically damaging.213
Law professor William Gallagher traced the impact of cease-and-desist letters
sent by senior mark holders.214 His findings indicated that the above described
impression of the system’s favoritism of the large senior mark holder is negatively
impacting exercise of rights in trademark law, due to the expense of defending.
[P]rivate IP enforcement practices - primarily "cease and desist" letters and
threats of litigation during the course of negotiations - are strategically used
to settle disputes, often resulting in a target's decision to capitulate to the
asserted IP claims. … [N]on-meritorious trademark and copyright claims are
indeed enforced successfully in many cases, thus substantiating the thesis
that IP rights are over-enforced in practice under the radar of the courts and
the formal legal system.215
Trademark law is in need of substantial reform with statutory guarantee of free speech
rights rather than a statutory incentive for large, wealthy mark holders to bully
smaller businesses. Self-help against big business practices may be advisable and
Grinvald, supra note 10, at 631.
Id. at 628.
213 Id. at 629. This bullying is a serious concern, as it has implications far beyond trademark law
and impacts the U.S. economy and the freedom of cultural expression. One of the harms produced by
bullying is that economic competition is impaired. In particular, small businesses and individuals are
more adversely affected, as these victims do not have the wherewithal to fight legal battles.
214 William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 456 (2011–2012). In recent years, as Congress has
created new intellectual property (IP) rights and courts have often interpreted those rights broadly,
legal scholars have frequently decried the expanded scope of protection afforded IP owners in most
substantive areas of IP law – including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and rights of publicity.
According to this critique, the over–expansion of IP rights throughout the past two decades harms
competition, chills free speech, and diminishes the public domain as increasingly broad areas of social
life are brought within the scope of strong IP protection. The author interviewed trademark lawyers
and created qualitative evidence of senior mark holders engaging in bullying through use of cease and
desist letters.
215 Id. at 461.
211
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later it is suggested that junior mark holders use internet resources to help them learn
more trademark law and strategies to defend against senior mark holders’ claims.
C. Terms and Concepts Should be Defined to Avoid a Chilling Effect of Unclear Law.
Third, the law may be having a chilling effect on junior mark holders asserting
their rights due to its lack of predictability. Clarification of the law could include
statutory
1.
definition of parody,
2.
guidelines for likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement, and
3.
recognition of First Amendment rights to use senior marks for proper and
creative purposes.
This section advocating defining crucial terms has two branches. One calls for
further legislation and/or judicial lawmaking. The other is that the purpose for doing
so is to promote uniformity and predictability in the law, two qualities that are lacking
in current trademark law. Improving predictability would decrease litigation and
encourage parties to come to the bargaining table with a greater incentive to
negotiate.216 Reducing the costs of compliance would help both government and
individual litigants.
1. Definition of parody.
Many trademark courts use the definition of parody derived from the Supreme
Court’s copyright fair use case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,217 where a musical parody was
a fair use of the original owner’s song Pretty Woman. The Court defined parody as “the
use of some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least
in part, comments on that author's works.” 218 David Simon, Fellow, Project on Law
and Mind Sciences, Harvard Law School, in his article on trademark’s “confusion
trap,” summarized parody from Campbell:
Parody, the Court stated, was a form of comment or criticism that ridicules
the original work by, for example, mimicking its style. It can be distinguished
from satire, which does not target the original work but instead uses it as a
vehicle to express some other (perhaps critical) message. The Court reasoned
that parody had a greater claim to fair use than satire. Parodists require the
original works to make their comment or criticism. Satirists, on the other
hand, have a weaker claim because they are not commenting or criticizing
directly the work they use.219

216 See Gallagher, supra note 214, Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 573 (1994)
(A number of lawyers advise clients not to sue on parody claims because it is so unpredictable.).
217 Id. at 571.
218 Id. at 580.
219 David A. Simon, The Confusion Trap: Rethinking Parody in Trademark Law, 88 Wash. L. Rev.
1021, 1024 (2013).
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The parody/satire distinction recognized in copyright does not seem workable in
trademark law and it causes defendants and courts to work hard to characterize the
work as a parody.220 The senior mark holder in a trademark dilution situation is
famous by definition, so calling the mark to mind will represent consumerism at the
very least. In trademark it makes sense to provide fair use, or noninfringement
protection, to satiric works as well as to purely parodic works. 221 So the Campbell
definition is not adequate for trademark.222 Courts applying trademark law are not
uniform in their interpretation of whether a use is parodic, satiric, and/or
permissible.223
In addition, a trademark use’s status as a parody should not depend on the junior
mark holder's intent, since similar situations would be treated differently based on
one’s state of mind and the care one used in documenting it. 224 But the use must be
more than free riding or publicity seeking. For instance, in Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders the mark was used for attention, not for parody or satire, so the use was
not protected.225 A parody should be protected even if it (1) is biting; (2) is directed or
aimed at a favorite local or national company or person; or (3) expresses a position or
view that is unpopular. 226 DUMB STARBUCKS may have been sufficiently biting,
since the term dumb is somewhat pejorative.
The TDRA has incorporated parody, albeit without definition, into the defenses
section of the dilution statute. 227 It creates a bright line for noncommercial parodies
that are not used as source identifiers, saying they are permitted. 228 However, most
parodic uses of a senior mark are probably done by a junior mark holder for commercial
purposes and as its own source identification, a brand parody. 229 So the statute does
not expressly help most junior parodic mark holders. 230 It makes sense to have
220 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 500 (Courts that make the distinction must decide what
qualifies as a parody, including deciding: “is a subsidiary purpose to make fun of the plaintiff enough,
or must it be the primary focus of the defendant's use? … Does the defendant's intent to make a parody
… matter? Does it matter how the audience perceives it?”).
221 Simon, supra note 219 at 1028.
This author asks whether parody under copyright and
Campbell is followed by trademark law and he answers basically yes. He includes a proposal for how
courts might handle parody in trademark situations better.
222 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 490. (“Lacking tools specifically designed for parody,
courts treat it in an ad hoc way that reflects their own subjective assessment of the value or parody
and the morality of free rides.”)
223 Simon, supra note 219, at 1024.
224 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 504. Dogan & Lemly recommend that courts use a
nominative fair use framework for analyzing trademark parodies. Id. at 508.
225 See Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205–06 (2d Cir.
1979).
226 The federal and state governments could still use criminal law to prevent pornography by a
mark holder. See e.g., Alexander v. US, 509 U.S. 544, 555-56 (1993).
227 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2012).
228 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2012). The way the statute reads, it is actually two different
defenses. One defense is that the use is not commercial. The other defense is that the use is a fair
use AND the use is not as a source indicator, a brand identification.
229 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 484 et seq.
230 Eugene C. Lim, Of Chew Toys and Designer Handbags: A Critical Analysis of the "Parody"
Exception under the U.S. Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 35 CAMPBELL L. REV. 83, 85 (2012).
While parodies have recently received some legislative attention…through the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA), the dividing line between a "legitimate"
parody and a "dilutive" parody is not entirely clear, and the rather imprecise
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legislation that clearly defines parody and then provides guidance for courts in
analyzing the legality of a junior mark holder’s parody under the particular
circumstances of a case. This would promote uniformity and predictability in the law
so that when a junior mark holder is considering making a parodic use of a senior
mark, its legality will be more predictable.231
DUMB STARBUCKS is brand parody, although Nathan Fielder was not really
building a brand. He was free riding in the sense that he was appealing to the
Starbucks allure. But he was not really competing with Starbucks, but was making
satiric comment on the use of another’s trademark. An illustration of a truer brand
parody was provided by Dogan & Lemley who used the pre-dilution case involving
Lardashe jeans as a play on both Jordache and lard ass, a pejorative term for an
overweight person who carries the excess weight in the buttocks. 232 Since the case was
decided before either of the federal dilution statutes, it may not be decided in the same
way today. If it would be, its similarity to DUMB STARBUCKS is that it makes fun
of overweight people as much as it parodizes the Jordache brand. Similarly, DUMB
STARBUCKS makes fun of the inanity of the law as much or more than it parodizes
Starbucks. It appears from the parody cases since 2006, when the TDRA became
effective, that some courts have continued to apply their prior legal understanding of
parody’s permissible use in trademark, but the Sixth Circuit that decided Moseley has
decided not to protect brand parody with sexual connotations.
Dogan & Lemley’s analysis would permit satiric uses of the senior mark even with
the strong TDRA dilution statute. They noted that in trademark parody cases, many
courts dwell less on whether the parody meets some criteria than on whether there is
likelihood of confusion or dilution. If the court finds the use is neither likely to cause
confusion nor dilution, then the junior user’s parodic use is generally, but not always,
permitted.233

language of the TDRA has provoked an interesting debate among trademark
scholars and commentators. While some commentators have applauded the TDRA
as having broadened the protection of civil liberties through its "fair use" provision,
others have argued that the TDRA takes freedom of expression too far by failing to
provide adequate protection against tarnishment caused by artistic works that
sully the reputation or good name of a famous trademark.
Id. Lim asserted that the TDRA’s parody provision “is too lenient vis–a–vis artistic parodies that
are not used as trademarks and yet too strict with respect to source–identifying parodies.”
231 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 474:
We conclude that, despite increasing attention to speech interests in recent years,
the law's treatment of parody reflects too much uncertainty, leaving would–be
parodists vulnerable to threats of legal action by trademark holders. In particular,
given the flexibility of likelihood of confusion analysis, parodists' fate is usually
determined by the subjective judgment of courts, whose treatment of parody often
seems to turn on instinct rather than trademark principles.
232
See
Lard-Ass,
OXFORD
DICTIONARY,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/lard-ass (last visited Jan. 24,
2015). The opinion is Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1483 (10th Cir.
1987).
233 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 476 (stating, “Other courts have reached similar results by
reference to trademark law's standard likelihood of confusion test.”).
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2. Guidelines for likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement
Courts seem to use the concept of consumer confusion for infringement and
dilution, even though it is not an element of dilution. The TDRA says:
the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive…shall be entitled to an
injunction against another person who…commences use of a mark…that is
likely to cause dilution…regardless of the presence or absence of actual or
likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury. 234
The reference to “likely confusion” in the TDRA indicates that a court can find a
junior mark holder liable for both trademark infringement and dilution. McCarthy,
on the other hand, suggests that if a court has found trademark infringement, it has
no reason to further consider dilution, since the court has already found for the senior
mark holder.235 Dilution is to be considered when there is no likelihood of confusion,
but the senior mark holder asserts it is likely to be harmed in either the distinctiveness
of the mark or in its reputation (blurring or tarnishment). Therefore, the following
analysis of confusion relates primarily to when the senior mark holder alleges
trademark infringement rather than dilution.
Confusion will often be irrelevant in a well-crafted parody because one of the
messages that a parody conveys is “that it is not the original and is instead a parody.”236
A senior mark holder is not likely to create a parody of its own brand and most
consumers recognize this. However, a court should consider confusion and it can be a
determining factor (1) where a parodist intends to confuse the public, (2) the marks
are confusingly similar, or (3) confusion actually results. Courts could narrow their
interpretation of confusion by first determining who the relevant audience is for the
confusion test.237 Two products in different markets can use similar names without
unduly confusing potential purchasers, like LEXIS and LEXUS. The Hormel court
recognized that Jim Henson’s Spa’am product was a movie and Hormel’s Spam product
was canned meat.238 In DUMB STARBUCKS’ case, a court might determine that
Fielder’s product was a comedy show and Starbucks’ product was coffee and pastries.
But courts might erroneously define the relevant market; the Mutual of Omaha court
said that since the insurance company Mutual of Omaha also produced and sold tshirts and Novak also sold t-shirts with his Mutant of Omaha image, that they were
in the same market.239 Clearly they were not selling t-shirts in competition with one

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(2012).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 35, at § 24:72, at 24–213 (2014) (“Dilution: Beyond the Likelihood
of Confusion”).
236 See text accompanying supra notes 149–157. See also Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson
Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d Cir. 1996).
237 Shashank Upadhye, Trademark Surveys: Identifying the Relevant Universe of Confused
Consumers, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 549, 551 (1998) (discussing who the relevant
consumer is under prior law).
238 See Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 503.
239 Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1987).
234
235
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another. Consumers who saw Mutant of Omaha t-shirts would not believe that the
shirts were produced by Mutual of Omaha.240
A tangential problem regarding proof of likelihood of confusion is judicial
confusion over the probative value of surveys. The problems with determining the
probative value of surveys is beyond the scope of this article, other than to suggest that
legislation dictating what survey evidence is probative would put marketing specialists
on notice of the legal and logical standards courts will apply to determine whether the
survey will be probative in court.
3. Recognition of First Amendment rights to use senior marks for proper purposes.
The next section suggests that courts should more consistently consider First
Amendment rights of the junior mark holder. In addition, Congress should recognize
freedom of speech in commercial settings in the trademark statute sections that
recognize junior mark holder defenses, such as in the TDRA and for general trademark
infringement. When it statutorily recognized the limited parody defense (exclusion)
under the TDRA, this was a first step in legislative recognition of free speech rights
guarded in the U.S. Congress could further recognize the public’s free speech rights in
trademark situations, since the legislative purpose is to provide for the common
welfare, not just wealthy and famous trademark holder’s rights to stop others from
inappropriately referencing the senior mark. Meanwhile, as the next section indicates,
the courts tend to raise First Amendment considerations when considering trademark
infringement and dilution claims, as evidenced in the case summaries provided above.
D. Commercial and Brand Parody Should Have Broader First Amendment Protection
than that Expressed in the TDRA.
Courts should consider broader First Amendment protections for the junior mark
holder to use the senior mark even when the junior mark is not a true parody. In
dealing with free speech in Hustler, a defamation case involving free speech and
parody, the Supreme Court said that refusing to protect “outrageous” speech is not an
acceptable standard.
Outrageousness in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the
jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular
expression. An "outrageousness" standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal
to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience.241
If outrageousness is not a suitable standard for tort law, it is equally unsuitable
for trademark dilution actions. Hustler is particularly important to consider in light

240 The district court and the court of appeals considered the survey to be “properly conducted”
even though some of the most significant questions dealt with whether Mutual of Omaha “went along”
with Novak’s t–shirts, questions that the courts acknowledged to be ambiguous. Id. at 400.
241 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
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of the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Moseley II that if the junior mark involves a sexually
related association, it will be presumed to be diluting of the senior mark. 242
In commercial parodies generally the parties are two commercial enterprises,
although they may not be of the same size; the First Amendment protects even
commercial speech, although to a lesser extent than ideological speech. 243 DUMB
STARBUCKS involves commercial speech, even though Fielder gave away the coffee,
since it was a sort of advertisement for his comedy show. But regardless of the
commercial nature, the intent of the parodic use to entertain the public should be
protected.
[T]he correct question is not whether speech is commercial or not, but
whether it is commercial to such an extent as to overwhelm the underlying
parody. … [I]t is virtually unimaginable, particularly in dilution actions, that
commercial purpose ever overwhelms the parody, provided the parody is
genuine. Courts should begin by looking at whether the defendant has a
genuine parody, not whether the parody is primarily commercial.244
Of course, as previously mentioned, the law should restrict free riding that claims to
be a parody.245
In conclusion, trademark law would benefit by an explanation of what parody is
in the context of trademark. It is not the same thing as it is in copyright law. What
copyright law might call satire and for which it might be inclined to provide less fair
use protection is not necessarily desirable in trademark law. Having a better
explanation of tarnishment, how it is distinct from blurring, would be helpful as well.
It may result in courts discovering that what might be thought of as tarnishment is
merely parody and should still be protected as a type of brand parody. Second, while
this area of law is notoriously unpredictable, the law could be made more predictable
by statutory descriptions of what is fair use, parody, tarnishment, and the like. The
authors also suggest removing the cause of action for dilution altogether or balancing
it with a statute that literally says courts and the law must protect reasonable First
Amendment rights to use others’ trademarks, even when doing so might be offensive
to the court, to the senior mark holder, and/or to some members of the public.
In an area of law involving ordinary business usage such as trademark, making
the law more predictable and uniform is desirable. The legislature and courts should
create a clear definition of parody that is practical, consistent, and easy to
operationalize. The advantages of a clear definition are that it would:
1.
Encourage businesses to play by the legal rules and not engage in
excessive trademark policing,
2.
Discourage trademark bullying,
3.
Discourage socially undesirable litigation which is expensive to the
individuals and the taxpayers who fund the legal system,
242 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Thus, any new mark
with a lewd or offensive–to–some sexual association raises a strong inference of tarnishment.”)
243 Emerson, supra note 50, at 488 (“The history of the First Amendment evidences a longstanding
concern to protect parody, even where there is a commercial component to propagating the parody.”).
244 Id. at 488.
245 Id. at 489. See also Corina I. Cacovean, Is Free Riding Aided by Parody to Sneak Between the
Cracks of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act?, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 441, 443 (2009).
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Encourage good faith participation in settlement conferences and
alternate dispute resolution,
Provide a disincentive for free rider behavior, and
Encourage free speech, because the mere threat of litigation can have a
chilling effect on speech as the Supreme Court noted in New York Times
v. Sullivan.246

E. The Internet is a Good Tool to Educate Junior Mark Holders and the Public and to
Help Protect Freedom of Expression.
Fifth, the courts should reassess fair use and broaden its application in trademark
law. In Fielder’s case the parody was so dumb that courts might be inclined to deny
protection. Starbucks was not injured by his prank and the public was amused. There
was a net social gain by his use of DUMB STARBUCKS. Yet the law of dilution is so
ill-defined that predicting what a court might do is difficult. Is there protection for
dumb parody? Courts and legislature could create a new defense based on the public’s
right to have fun with famous marks so long as the famous mark is not severely
injured, even though the senior mark holder may be offended. This area in particular
is problematical under the current trademark enforcement system where the majority
of enforcement is done without involving the judicial system, according to law professor
William Gallagher’s interviews with IP lawyers, which revealed that the majority of
trademark issues are handled through cease-and-desist letters and never reach the
courtroom.247
While preparing the DUMB STARBUCKS story as a teaching case where the
students would use online searches to find the law, the authors discovered that a large
amount of useful and correct trademark law information is easily available online.
This is an area of law where the lay public has a strong interest in the development of
the law and the resolution of disputes. The online sites could help lay junior mark
holders make informed decisions on whether to parodize/satirize a famous mark or
not and to help the junior mark holder defend itself against at least the initial stages
of a claim by a famous senior mark holder. The Legal Information Institute at Cornell,
the U.S. government, law firms, and the Berkman Center for Internet and Society
provide the public with solid basic information and with explanations of where the law
is inconsistent from circuit to circuit.
However, lay users’ comments on the status of IP law are not always accurate.
But overall, the internet makes it easier for individuals to perform basic trademark
searches and to avoid infringement.248 For instance, the parodic t-shirt industry
246 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300–01 (1964). New York Times was a libel
suit, however, the authors have noted the similarities between defamation and some trademark
actions.
247 Gallagher, supra note 214, at 457.
A number of IP lawyers admitted that they sent
cease-and-desist letters even in situations where they thought the law would not support the client’s
claim. Id. at 461.
248 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office web site is available at www.uspto.gov and its Trademark
Electronic Search System (TESS) is available at tmsearch.uspto.gov. UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).; Trademark Electronic Search
System
(TESS),
UNITED
STATES
PATENT
AND
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
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through online marketing is huge, and those who design parodic t-shirts can take
advantage of their First Amendment free speech rights, being able to more accurately
predict whether the use might cross the line into commission of trademark and/or
copyright infringement. While DUMB STARBUCKS was not an internet marketing
device, Nathan Fielder took advantage of the internet to publicize his actions. He used
all the media forms that would acknowledge his antics to make his comedic (and
sincere) digs on parody in trademark usage. He had a hard copy of a document called
Frequently Asked Questions at the establishment and posted it on his website. While
the law contained in it might have been erroneous, his use of the internet enhanced
the social impact of his prank. In conclusion, an internet site and a junior mark holder
defense fund are good modern methods to protect First Amendment freedoms in the
face of legislation designed to protect interests of famous senior mark holders with no
corresponding protections for junior mark holders who would fairly engage in brand
parody.
Self-help through educating oneself about trademark law, is available through
online sources. There are several good internet sources, including Harvard’s,
Stanford’s, and Cornell’s IP websites.249 In addition, often law firms provide basic
information online for free, but one would have to pay for legal services. Another
possibility is to form a junior mark holder defense fund, similar to the Comic Book
Legal Defense Fund created by the comics industry. 250
F. Inconsistency Among Circuits Makes the Law Unpredictable
Sixth, there is a lack of consistency among the circuits. The TDRA may have been
developed to eliminate the variations and to guide the courts in a uniform
interpretation of dilution under federal trademark law. But it has not. It would be
helpful if the courts or the legislature would clarify the standard of proof issue raised
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=tess&state=4809:kurrn5.1.1 (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). The
Patent and Trademark Office also has state trademark information links at
www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/State_Trademark_Links.jsp.
State Trademark Information,
UNITED
STATES
PATENT
AND
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/State_Trademark_Links.jsp (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
See also, Gregory H. Guillot, All About Trademarks, GGMARK.COM, http://www.ggmark.com (last
visited May 16, 2014) (includes information about federal, state, and international trademark law).
See also, Overview of Trademark Law, supra note 34 , (provides summary of trademark law) and
Trademark, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trademark (last visited
June 25, 2014) (provides summary of trademark law and access to the statutes themselves).
249 Harvard operates the Berkman Center for Internet & Society, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu.
BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu (last visited July 5,
2014).
Stanford
operates
the
Stanford
IP
Litigation
Clearinghouse
at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs–and–centers/stanford–ip–litigation–
clearinghouse.
STANFORD
IP
LITIGATION
CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs–and–centers/stanford–ip–litigation–
clearinghouse (last visited July 5, 2014). Cornell operates the Legal Information Institute (LII), which
has IP information at http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/category/intellectual_property. Intellectual
Property,
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/category/intellectual_property (last visited July 5, 2014).
250 The Comic Book Defense Fund’s website is available at http://cbldf.org. COMIC BOOK LEGAL
DEFENSE FUND, http://cbldf.org (last visited Dec. 26, 2014).
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in Mosely II after the TDRA was enacted. In Starbucks VI the court identified
differences between itself, the Second Circuit, and both the Fourth Circuit and the
Ninth Circuits. The Vuitton case was a Fourth Circuit dilution case which the Second
Circuit refused to follow in its own dilution analyses. The Eighth Circuit finds dilution
and infringement under factual circumstances that the other circuits most likely would
not. The law should be predictable and consistent. In the case of parody in trademark
law, it is not.
G. Congress Should Eliminate Dilution in Federal Law.
Finally, dilution is designed to protect famous marks from being diluted by folks
who use the same mark to identify or name other products, for example, Buick aspirin,
and Tiffany restaurant. The effect of the dilution right under trademark law is to
remove the word TIFFANY from the trademark marketplace for anything other than
one jewelry store. Through the reputation of the jewelry store, the word TIFFANY has
come to mean elegance and expense, to have a secondary meaning to the public. While
some argue that allowing a junior mark holder to capitalize on the senior mark’s
reputation to cause the public to associate anything named TIFFANY to be elegant
and expensive, the likelihood that a poor quality restaurant named TIFFANY,
assuming there is no likelihood of confusion (which there was in the actual case), will
dilute the reputation of the jewelry store is not great. Hence, dilution has little use
under the U.S. trademark system, which is designed to be a consumer protection law
rather than a third IP system.
Besides, TIFFANY is also the name associated with Art Deco style stained glass
works, especially lamps. It so happens that a father and a son named their various
creative craft works after themselves. 251 Which TIFFANY should have a right to sue
to stop a restaurant from calling itself TIFFANY? Does the son’s business name dilute
the father’s reputation for elegance and expense? The rights to a trademark in a name,
while relevant here, is a larger topic than can be dealt with in this article.
Law professor Sandra Rierson in Myth and Reality of Dilution252 advanced three
claims regarding the disadvantages of dilution:
First, dilution statutes incorrectly assume that the source-identifying function of
a trademark is akin to a rivalrous good (a good that is dissipated by use). If marks are
nonrivalrous and therefore function more like words than disposable goods, the
economic justification for the dilution cause of action ceases to exist. Second, even if
diluting but noninfringing uses of famous trademarks do impair the source identifying
capacity of some marks, the social and transaction costs imposed by dilution law still
251
See
About
Tiffany
&
Co.,
TIFFANY
&
CO.,
FOR
THE
PRESS,
http://press.tiffany.com/ViewBackgrounder.aspx?backgrounderId=9 (last visited July 12, 2014). As
the son of Charles Lewis Tiffany, who founded Tiffany & Co. in 1837, Louis Comfort Tiffany might
have followed in his father’s footsteps. Instead, with an affinity for hard work and a fertile
imagination, he followed his own path to success and renown. Just as Charles Tiffany created
exquisite jewels for the well–to–do, building his “fancy goods” store into one of the great success stories
of the age, Louis Comfort Tiffany created his own extraordinary designs that enriched the lives of all
Americans.
252 Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of Dilution, 11 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 212, 213–214
(2012).
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outweigh the harm that it is designed to avert. Dilution claims inflict anticompetitive
burdens and, as a result, may entrench dominant (often oligopolist) firms at the
expense of market entrants. … Finally, the true foundation for dilution law lies in the
misplaced fiction of corporate personality, not in alleged economic harms. … Instead,
we have granted the holders of famous trademarks the equivalent of a moral right to
these marks: an extension of the rights granted to a creator of an expressive work in
the copyright context.
All three points dictate against continued federal protection of dilution claims.
Perhaps the lack of logical justification for dilution is part of the reason that courts are
not really able to distinguish between blurring and tarnishment and so are using
blurring where most would first think of tarnishment. 253 Also, under the current
business economic climate, courts and the legislature should be encouraging
competition in the marketplace, not squelching it through laws that protect the status
quo. Hence, the TDRA is an undesirable law because it is based on mistaken
assumptions about the use of trademark in U.S. law and society. It is an attempt to
incorporate personal property concepts into a legal area that under U.S. law lacks that
purpose.
Appendix III is a decision tree that provides a logical approach for courts
considering a purported parody by a junior mark holder and deciding whether to grant
an injunction against the junior mark holder’s use as an infringement or a dilution in
violation of trademark law. The actual analysis is more complex than the diagram
since courts can and should consider fair use, parody, and other First Amendment
defenses under both trademark infringement (not specified in the diagram) and under
dilution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law is constantly balancing competing interests. In trademark law, the
interests include: (1) the property rights of the senior mark holder who created the
mark and invested in it so that consumers would associate the mark with the senior
mark holder’s goods and services; (2) the free speech rights of the members of the public
who want to use the mark to communicate to others; (3) members of the public who
would receive the communication; and (4) the rights of consumers to know the
authentic purveyor of the goods and services available for purchase. It is beneficial to
society to encourage both commentary and public discourse and also to encourage
creativity.

253 Britt N. Lovejoy, Note: Tarnishing the Dilution by Tarnishment Cause of Action: Starbucks
Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc. and V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, Compared, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 623, 623–624 (2011):
Although the TDRA provides some guidance as to what factors might suggest a
likelihood of dilution by blurring, it does not provide similar guidance as to what a
plaintiff must show in order to prove a likelihood of tarnishment. The tarnishment
provision, unlike the blurring provision, does not include a list of factors for
consideration. … Despite this ambiguity, little scholarship has touched upon
dilution by tarnishment since the passage of the TDRA.
(citations omitted).
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Nathan Fielder claimed that DUMB STARBUCKS was a parody, and as such
was entitled to a legal defense in a trademark infringement or dilution claim by
Starbucks, the owner of the STARBUCKS mark. Whether his assertion is true on
either or both counts is far from clear based on examination of trademark statutory
law, parody cases, and scholarly reviews of trademark regarding dilution and parody,
all of which reveal that the law is not settled. Nathan Fielder’s defense might win in
one court and lose in another court. Minor statutory changes and additions could be
made to make judicial outcomes more predictable for junior mark holders trying to
parody a famous mark holder and to satirize the status of the law, so that they would
know whether they might be liable for trademark infringement, dilution, or another
unfair competition claim.
The question remains whether DUMB STARBUCKS would constitute a
parody. Is it really a parody/satire or just a publicity stunt to gain attention for Nathan
Fielder’s television show? Would this be dilution by tarnishment or blurring? Could
Starbucks successfully argue both? A trademark parody should be protected if the
trademark is relevant to the point being made by the parodist. In many cases, this
would require an analysis by the decider of fact. Somewhat more precise legislative
guidelines might be helpful to courts making the decisions. The parodist should not
be allowed to use a trademark just to get public attention at the expense of the
trademark holder when the trademark is irrelevant to his or her point. 254 The legal
system should not encourage that sort of free riding on the trademarked image.255 Was
Fielder a free-rider or an entertaining comic?

Eriq Gardner, Comedy Central Lawyers Approve 'Dumb Starbucks' Stunt, THE HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr–esq/comedy–central–lawyers–
approve–dumb–679246. Attorney Aaron Moss said,
You can’t just take a famous logo and trade dress, call it dumb and use it to
sell the very same products in competition with the company you’re making fun of.
I question whether it’s even a legitimate parody in the first place. The people behind
'Dumb Starbucks' are not making fun of 'Starbucks' so much as they’re using its
marks as a vehicle to sell their own commercial products.
255 See Cahoy, supra note 17, at 14. Any parody use of a trademark involves some degree of free–
riding:
By using a trademark as a source indicator, consumers are able to apply the
goodwill generated from products or services back to the originating company.
Without trademark protection, the goodwill created by a business based on its
products or services can simply be appropriated by competitors. Capitalizing on
the goodwill of another business is a disincentive to investment because it allows
free riders to unfairly compete. Trademarks, thus, promote investment by ensuring
that the intangible benefits received by the investor are not misappropriated by
competitors … This is the primary benefit which is gained by the property owner.
(citations omitted). Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 483 (arguing that trademark law should
not attempt to prevent all free riding by junior mark holders). The question remains as a policy what
free–riding should be illegal and what free–riding should be permitted or even encouraged.
254
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This appendix contains websites that reported the DUMB STARBUCKS story, copy
of Nathan Fielder’s Frequently Asked Questions, and images from the store when it
was open.
The following websites contain news stories and videos on Nathan Fielder’s DUMB
STARBUCKS publicity stunt.
Starbucks Responds to Dumb Starbucks in L.A., U.S.A. TODAY, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/02/10/dumb-starbucks-parodyfree-coffee/5357597/ (last visited June 25, 2014).
TV Comedian Nathan Fielder behind Dumb Starbucks, CBS NEWS (February 11,
2014), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/tv-comedian-nathan-fielder-behinddumb-starbucks/ (last visited June 23, 2014).
Dumb Starbucks Founder Nathan Fielder on Jimmy Kimmel Live, YOUTUBE
(February 12, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4MJWz3w5ZQc
(last visited June 25, 2014).
Dumb Starbucks@dumbstarbucks, TWITTER, available at
https://twitter.com/dumbstarbucks (last visited June 25, 2014).
Dumb Starbucks (press release), YOUTUBE, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bo_deCOd1HU (last visited June 25, 2014).
David Boroff, “Dumb Starbucks,” brainchild of Comedy Central star, shut down by
health inspectors, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Tuesday, February 11, 2014), available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/tv-movies/dumb-starbucks-shut-healthinspectors-article-1.1609947 (last visited June 25, 2014).
Nathan Fielder Tells Jimmie Kimmel He Could Get Jail Time for ‘Dumb Starbucks’
Joke (Video), The Hollywood Reporter (February 11, 2014), available at
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/video-nathan-fielder-tells-jimmy-679673
(last visited June 25, 2014).
CBS News (February 11, 2014), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/tvcomedian-nathan-fielder-behind-dumb-starbucks/ (last visited June 23, 2014).
Dumb Starbucks has a Twitter account accessible at
https://twitter.com/dumbstarbucks (last visited June 23, 2014).
Dumb Starbucks Creator Nathan Fielder’s Press Conference, HUFFINGTON POST
(2/10/2014, updated 4/12/2014), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shiralazar/dumb-starbucks-creator-na_b_4764158.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
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Images from Dumb Starbucks, Nathan Fielder Explains the Store’s Creation,
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bo_deCOd1HU) (last visited Feb. 28,
2014).
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TRADEMARK PARODY CASES SINCE 2006;
Key: N = no, Y = yes, N/A = not applicable/not ruled on.

Case

Circuit/l
evel
6/appell
ate
2/appell
ate
4/appell
ate
4/trial

LOC

Tarnis
hment
Y

Parody

Comments

N/A

Blurri
ng
N/A

N/A

Victoria’s Secret won.

N/A

N

N/A

Y

Starbucks lost.

N

N

N

Y

Y

N/A

Y

N

11/trial

N

N/A

N/A

Y

Louis
Vuitton v.
Hyundai
ELF ON
THE
SHELF

2/trial

N

Y

N/A

N

11/trial

N

N/A

N/A

Y

Protect
Marriage

9/trial

N

N/A

N/A

Y

Lettuce
Entertain
You
Hershey

7/trial

N/A

N/A

N/A

Y

6/trial

*N,
but…

N/A

Y

N

BUTTWI
PER

8/trial

Y

N

N

N

NAKED
COWBO
Y
Wal-Mart

2/trial

Y

N

N

Y

11/trial

N

N/A

N

Y

Louis Vuitton lost. Court discussed First
Amendment defense in trademark law.
NAACP won. Court added First
Amendment as defense.
A&F won. Court used “trademark fair use”
without mentioning dilution. State dilution
claim failed because plaintiff’s mark was not
distinctive.
Louis Vuitton won. Court denied fair use
even though ad commented on Louis
Vuitton products as representing luxury.
Elf Off won. Court considered both
copyright and trademark, treating parody
separately under each claim. No dilution
discussion.
Defendant’s parody of a heterosexual family
won. Court used First Amendment and
parody as one and did not mention dilution.
Defendant won. Court applied the “fair use”
defense from 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4), not
from the TDRA.
Hershey won on *trademark infringement
even though there was no likelihood of
confusion. The court said there was blurring
and it was not a parody.
Anheuser-Busch won on trademark
infringement! Court relied on survey, which
other courts had not used.
Defendant Mars won on motion to dismiss,
not on merits. Mars claimed parody, First
Amendment, and fair use.
Plaintiff maker of WALOCAUST prevailed.
Cause was for declaratory judgment.
Majority of opinion is about viability of
survey evidence.

THE
SITUATI
ON

Moseley
II
CHARBU
CKS
CHEWY
VUITON
NAACP
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